My blog about philosophy, coding, and anything else that interests me.
17 – Richard Dawkins vs Bret Weinstein
Artificial Creativity
A commentary on a debate between Richard Dawkins and Bret Weinstein.
The soundbites are from this video: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hYzU-DoEV6k
The interview with Weinstein I later reference: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rm8FksjlJtM
Other references:
- The neo-Darwinian theory of the mind: https://blog.dennishackethal.com/posts/the-neo-darwinian-theory-of-the-mind
- David Deutsch's "The Beginning of Infinity": https://www.amazon.com/Beginning-Infinity-Explanations-Transform-World/dp/0143121359/
- Richard Dawkins' "The Selfish Gene": https://www.amazon.com/Selfish-Gene-Anniversary-Landmark-Paperback/dp/B0722G5V92/
- David Deutsch's "What is Computation? (How) Does Nature Compute?": https://legacy.cs.indiana.edu/~dgerman/hector/deutsch.pdf
Transcript
This transcript was generated automatically and may contain mistakes.
Dennis: Logan Chipkin recently recommended to me a conversation between Richard Dawkins and Bret Weinstein. They are both evolutionary biologists, and I watched the video of the conversation. I have the audio of it here for you, and I figured it might be interesting to listen to it together, and then go over it step by step and kind of deconstruct what they’re saying, because I think they make interesting points and there are errors creeping in here and there. And so I wanted to point them out and try to correct them. And something to note is that the audio is from, let’s see, the video was published on November 28th, 2018. So this might have happened a little bit before then. So this, this video is almost a couple years old, I would imagine. So who knows how their opinions, Dawkins’ and Weinstein’s opinions have changed since, if at all, I don’t know.
Something else to note is that the video that I’m basing this audio off of is cut up. It seems that there are sections missing without any explanation given by the whoever posted this, Pangburn Philosophy, I think. So not clear what happened there. This may impact my discussion of their ideas because it means that, maybe they said something that I don’t know about but that I’m criticizing them without knowing that, so that maybe something that would have refuted my, my criticism, but I can’t know it. So keep that in mind as you listen.
And so what I’m going to do is I’m just going to play the audio for you, and then I’m going to basically just pause the audio, comment on whenever I think it’s worth commenting, and I hope you find it interesting. So let’s get started.
Bret Weinstein: Let us pray.
Dennis: The guy you just heard there, that’s Bret Weinstein’s voice, so keep in mind the American accent, that’s Bret Weinstein, the British accent, that’s Richard Dawkins.
I don’t know why he opened with that joke. Maybe he wants to signal to people that they’re about to have a fun evening. I guess, I mean, I’d rather they just concentrate on the ideas and take them seriously. All right.
Bret Weinstein: No, that’s not where the evening is headed. Did you want to say a few words or?
Richard Dawkins: I’ll say a few in a moment, but carry on.
Bret Weinstein: So, I wanted to give a little bit of an orientation to where we are this evening. I think this is actually a unique opportunity that we have. Richard and I are both evolutionary biologists, dyed in the wool, and we come from a lineage of thought, and that lineage of thought has brought us to many of the same conclusions. But there are places in which our thoughts depart from each other. And so tonight we’re going to talk about biology and especially, I believe, what it has to say about human beings and the manner in which they evolve.
Dennis: I just want to say from the start, this is what Bret Weinstein just summarized, the evolution of human biology and then also how it informs human behavior and ideas. That is their main point of contention. That is their main disagreement, as you will see later on. I just want to plant the flag here to make it easier to recognize it later on. That’s the main disagreement between them.
Bret Weinstein: The fact that we disagree over some important things is potentially fraught, but I’m hoping that to the extent that there is a confrontation between ideas here, that it will be a friendly confrontation. I believe we are both from a tradition in which we believe that honorable disagreement is important and it is essential to society functioning well. And so I hope that even if the disagreements are intense at times, that it is in the context of friendship.
Richard Dawkins: Good.
Bret Weinstein: All right, good. So we’re on the same page. Maybe I should also say that I am at something of an advantage here because Richard has done such an excellent job of documenting his thoughts on evolution in his many excellent books, and for the 14 years that I taught evolutionary biology at Evergreen, I without fail assigned The Selfish Gene to my students.
Dennis: I agree with Bret that he has an advantage over Richard because it’s surprisingly difficult, maybe not so surprising, but it’s really difficult to find anything that Bret has written. I checked out his website and there are links to a bunch of talks that he gave or, like, debates that he had, but I couldn’t find anything. Like, I would have loved to see a long form, or even short form, that’s fine too, but like an article or a blog post or something where he, where he lays out his arguments, because then they would be easier to criticize. It’s really difficult to, to listen to all his talks or to watch all of his debates. You could get those transcripts maybe, but they’re not always, you know, they’re not always very good and they’re not edited.
So it’d be easier to criticize them, and he definitely has an advantage there because Richard, on the other hand, does make his work vulnerable to criticism, or at least easily vulnerable to criticism, because it’s all in written form and it’s also been out there for a long time, so people have had plenty of time to criticize it. I found some papers of Bret’s on Google Scholar. There weren’t any on the archive or arXiv, or I don’t know how you pronounce it. But the papers of his that he authored or co-authored that I found on Google Scholar, these are not for the general public. Like, if you read the first few sentences of the abstracts, he’s going to lose 99% of people there.
So I would love to, I mean, maybe there’s something out there, if you can comment on this and tell me, maybe there’s something out there that I missed where Bret has written to a general audience something easily understandable so that people have an easier time criticizing his ideas. I think that would be very helpful to know.
Dawkins has written those scientific papers too, and those are also not for the general reader, but he’s written plenty of stuff that is accessible to the general reader. And I would imagine that he’s gotten a fair amount of, he’s received a fair amount of helpful criticism, friendly or unfriendly, because he made himself vulnerable in that way. And I don’t see Bret having made himself vulnerable in that way yet.
Bret Weinstein: Now, The Selfish Gene, you wrote in 1976. Am I correct about that? You were 35 years old? So Richard wrote that book as a young gun. And I find it shocking that I have to say this, but I think that that book is still cutting edge. The reason I assigned it to my students was that I thought that in general it presented the best encapsulation of what we understood about evolutionary dynamics that was available. And while there are a few things that aren’t in it that have emerged later, I still believe that to be the case.
Dennis: I agree with Bret’s assessment of The Selfish Gene. I think The Selfish Gene is a great book, and I agree that it probably is still today cutting edge. There are a couple of things that I noticed as I was reading it. Maybe I’ll get into those later. But yes, I think the reason The Selfish Gene is so good is because Dawkins really takes the notion of replicators and the gene’s-eye view of evolution seriously. He takes those ideas seriously. And I think that’s why the book is, that’s at least partly why the book is so good.
Bret Weinstein: And so one of the things we may end up talking about tonight is why it is that there has not been more progress after the huge burst of activity that we saw in the late 60s and early 70s, why my era has been much quieter with respect to important discoveries about evolution that we all agree are true. Do you have anything to add?
Richard Dawkins: Yes, I don’t quite know why you find it shocking. I mean, of course we all pay lip service to the idea that progress is good and we should be changing all the time, but what if we’re right? And so it doesn’t necessarily follow that what people thought in the 1960s and 70s is still largely believed is a bad thing. Maybe it is actually right.
Dennis: I think this is a great response of Dawkins. It shows again that he takes his ideas seriously. The fallibilist in me is a bit torn, because I do think that, you know, it’s, for all our theories, even our best theories, we should assume that they’re riddled with error, and I would imagine the same is true of neo-Darwinian evolution and, and how Richard Dawkins explained it and built on it in The Selfish Gene. But there is something to the idea that, you know, if progress hasn’t been made since, that doesn’t mean that the ideas are out of date or bad or something. So I definitely agree with Dawkins here. I could see it going both ways.
Bret Weinstein: Well, I think this is a very interesting perspective, and it’s one that I held too. When I was in college, I was a student of Robert Trivers, who’s a contemporary of Richard’s. And as his student, I looked at the landscape of questions, and I felt, it wasn’t resentment, but I felt some sadness that it looked like Richard and Bob’s generation had run the table and they had solved all of the big issues in evolutionary biology and that they had left only small issues for us.
And over time, I came to realize that that wasn’t the case, that there were major issues left unsettled that we had stopped talking about because there was no progress. And so I took up looking at those issues and saying, what is it that we have wrong that has caused us to stop making progress on questions like, why do females in many species require males to engage in elaborate displays before mating with them? That question is still not answered. There are plenty of ideas on the table. But as for one that we all agree on, nothing has emerged.
Dennis: It seems to me that Bret here is invoking scientific consensus as a criterion of reality. And I think that’s false. It doesn’t matter if everyone agrees that something is true or not. Following David Deutsch, I think all that matters is whether or not we’ve found a good explanation. If other scientists then disagree with that, I’m saying this now, David is not saying this, but I don’t think if other scientists disagree that that says anything about the idea itself. Also, I think within neo-Darwinism we can explain why the males of certain species have to put on elaborate displays to attract females, but I think they’re going to get into that a little more later.
Bret Weinstein: Why are there more species when you get closer to the equator and fewer species as you move towards the poles? Why do we grow feeble and inefficient with age? These are all questions on which some progress had been made, but that progress seemed to me to have stagnated. So I don’t disagree with you that your generation got an awful lot right. But what I wonder about is why progress has slowed given the number of large questions that remain.
And a related question is why there does not seem to be a generation of biologists that followed you that appear to be working in a way that would allow them to solve big questions in the way that R.A. Fisher had, or you did, or Bob Trivers did. I don’t see that generation of biologists that are capable of wielding tools in the bold way that you all managed.
Dennis: My guess, to answer his two questions, is because people don’t take neo-Darwinism seriously enough, and that leads to all kinds of misconceptions like survival of the fittest or, you know, that it’s, that there’s something like group selection or into our selection of individuals, which survival of the fittest is really closely related to. If you don’t take neo-Darwinism seriously, then you get these misconceptions kind of creeping in, or at least they’re much harder to correct, and I’m guessing many of these misconceptions around evolution prevent progress. But as Richard is about to say, the field is actually still bustling with contributions, so maybe it’s not as bleak as Bret Weinstein is making it out to be.
Richard Dawkins: I think then the onus is on you. I mean, let’s talk about a particular example, like, say, the sexual selection one you raised, and say, what is it that you think hasn’t been... Well, obviously, you’re right, it’s still going on and there’s much controversy going on. It’s a very flourishing field. There are lots of people working in the field, doing work out in the field on sexual selection. There are two major strands of theory of sexual selection. Perhaps you could trace them to Fisher on the one hand and, well, Wallace, Zahavi, Hamilton on the other. And they’re both very interesting theories. They probably might both work. I mean, what’s wrong with that?
Bret Weinstein: It’s a great question. Here’s what’s wrong with it. So what Richard is referring to, and I believe both you and I would come out on the Hamilton side of this argument, and we would both, I would imagine, be advocates for a good genes interpretation.
Richard Dawkins: Well, no, I would be... Do we need to explain what this is?
Bret Weinstein: Yeah, maybe.
Dennis: Thankfully, Dawkins offers to explain what they’re talking about. Bret threw around a bunch of names that probably most of the audience doesn’t know, and the audience doesn’t have any way of interacting with the speakers at this point, so they could have just carried on and would have lost most of the audience. But fortunately Dawkins realized that, pointed it out, posed the question to the audience, and I don’t know if you could hear it, it was kind of quiet, but there was a female voice, I think, that enthusiastically responded yes to Dawkins’ question whether or not they should explain this.
Richard Dawkins: Yeah. Darwin noticed that many biological characteristics, animal characteristics of males especially, are apparently advertising to females. Peacocks’ tails, gorgeous feathers, beautiful fish, that kind of thing. And Darwin was content simply to say, that’s what females like. It’s an aesthetic thing, a matter of female whim. And so in order for a male to reproduce successfully and pass on his genes, he has to be attractive, and therefore genes for being attractive get passed on to the next generation because females choose them.
Wallace, the co-discoverer of natural selection, hated that idea. Wallace was more of a utilitarian and believed that beautiful characteristics like peacocks’ tails had to be useful. It wasn’t enough just to simply say females love them; you had to say this is somehow an advertisement for a good male, a male who’s going to be a good father or provide good genes. Wallace wouldn’t have used that phraseology, of course. And that divide between Darwin and Wallace has persisted from the 19th century through the 20th century.
Wallace felt that to invoke female taste was bordering on mysticism, and Darwin’s idea there was rescued in the 1920s and 30s by R.A. Fisher, one of the great founders of modern population genetics, and R.A. Fisher made the Darwin theory respectable by allowing female choice to be under genetic control just as much as male anatomy.
Dennis: This point that not only is an animal’s or any organism’s anatomy genetically determined, but also its behavior, except for humans, which I’ll discuss later, that is very, very important.
Richard Dawkins: Male tails, etc., are under genetic control. And Fisher produced a model, which must have been a mathematical model, although he didn’t lay it out in mathematical terms, it must have been there, in which natural selection simultaneously works on genes in males for being beautiful and genes in females for liking beauty. And when you realize that both baby males and baby females inherit the genes from their father for being beautiful and the genes from their mother for liking beauty, those two go together and can produce something like a peacock’s tail. That was the Fisher theory, which has been brought up to date by modern mathematical biologists.
But the Wallace strand of theory, which Bret favours and to some extent so do I, agrees with Wallace that beauty has to be useful and adopts the idea that what a male is doing when advertising to females is advertising to females, for example, that he’s healthy, that he’s strong. In the extreme version of the theory, due to Amos Zahavi, a male is advertising that he’s such a good fit male that he’s capable of surviving in spite of having this ridiculous tail, which should have killed him because it’s vulnerable to predators, you can’t fly very well with it, and so on.
And less extreme versions of that theory are attributable to W.D. Hamilton, who thought that health was the primary virtue which a male is advertising to females, and a beautiful tail is an advertisement to a female: this is a healthy male, he’s not suffering from parasites, he’s resistant to parasites, otherwise he wouldn’t have this beautiful glowing sexy tail.
Dennis: I just want to point out here that I think Dawkins takes some linguistic shortcuts, for example, and that’s fine to do. I just want to point out that, just a gotcha with them, which is, let’s say it’s true that male peacocks with beautiful tails somehow present their, somehow showcase their strength or that they’re free from parasites. It’s not like female peacocks would have any idea what a parasite is or would have any idea what it means to be strong or something. It’s just that if males with beautiful tails are also the ones that are stronger, then natural selection will favor them if that helps their genes spread. That’s always the caveat.
So we shouldn’t put too much agency there into the female, female peacock’s mind or brain, because the female peacock has no idea what it’s doing or why. Like, the, the female peacock doesn’t know why it’s choosing a certain male over another. It just does it. And it just does it blindly according to the instructions that it’s genetically given.
Richard Dawkins: So that was just an interruption because we were talking about the, there’s a Zahavi–Hamilton type theory, which Bret favors. Sorry.
Bret Weinstein: Okay. So no, that’s perfect. And it actually shows exactly the point that I was trying to make, which is that you’ve now heard a lot. There’s plenty of good work that suggests that this could be a handicap that would demonstrate that genes have to be heritable in order for females to be favored to be selecting for them. But the problem is that there is a rotten piece of this theory right at the heart, which is that females are choosing to inflict this burden on their male offspring, which is ecologically certain to be costly to them. So if females are attempting to find good genes by putting males through a test, then they are inflicting bad genes on their male offspring. Those bad genes will be transmitted by their female offspring but not expressed, so the females will not suffer the cost of that handicap.
But there’s a question of how it is that females recover enough of a benefit for their female offspring to justify the cost for the male offspring. So there’s a way in which, although one can make a mathematically compelling argument for a handicap idea or a good genes idea, that it has to account for a very large benefit for female offspring. And what’s worse...
Dennis: So Bret Weinstein speaks of benefits to the female offspring here and disadvantages to the male offspring. This sounds a little bit like he thinks that individual organisms, in this case peacocks, are the unit of selection, and which isn’t true. It’s, it’s their genes that are the unit of selection. And it also sounds like he’s thinking in terms of benefits and disadvantages, like what would be best for peacocks, both the males and the females, and that’s not how evolution works. It’s only about what helps the replicator spread. Maybe that’s what he means here. I just want to point it out that that’s not clear to me. When I say replicator, I mean the gene in this case. The gene is the replicator in biological evolution.
And I should also point out that the distinction between benefits for the individual organism or the group or whatever it may be versus the replicator’s ability to spread, that distinction is hugely important, because David Deutsch in The Beginning of Infinity, he gives this example where due to a genetic mutation in a species of bird, which I think leads to a difference in their mating schedule, it helps the replicator spread at the cost of, I think, both the individuals in the group and the, that species of bird as a whole. So it’s not at all clear that helping the replicator spread is even good for the species. It can, it can even lead to the extinction of the entire species.
So I would avoid speaking in terms of benefits and disadvantages altogether. I would just speak in terms of what helps the replicator spread and what doesn’t. And I would largely avoid talking about individual organisms or groups of organisms unless you specify at the beginning that you’re just using them as a stand-in for the replicator, because sometimes it’s easier to talk about them that way. But that has to be clear from the start.
Bret Weinstein: If you imagine a species, like, let’s say we’re talking about peacocks. Peacocks, the female, the peahen, inflicts this marvelous tail on her male offspring by choosing fathers that have it. In peacocks, like all creatures that have these elaborate displays, males contribute nothing other than genes. So if she’s picking something valuable, it has to be encoded in the genes. So she inflicts this cost on her male offspring and presumably then acquires a benefit for her female offspring. But they do this each and every generation. Only a small number of males in each generation mate. Females choosing these tails pick the same males again and again.
So that ought to leave the number of bad genes in the environment very small, because females are eliminating those bad genes each and every generation, which means that after a small number of generations, there ought to be very little advantage in picking males with beautiful tails, because there are no bad genes left. And so the question is, if one of these good genes hypotheses is correct, why is female vigilance constant?
It should be: females select against bad genes, the number of bad genes drops, female vigilance now has no value, female vigilance should drop, bad genes should crop back up, female vigilance should rise again, and we should see an oscillating pattern. But we don’t see it. What we see is generation after generation, females choose the males with the most elaborate tails. So, it doesn’t matter what the answer is here. The point is this is a question that year after year remains with us and we make no progress on it. We are still fumbling with explanations that have one value but don’t completely answer the question. So why is that?
Richard Dawkins: But this is a matter for mathematical modeling, and it’s being done. And there are various different mathematical models, which we can’t go into now. But this is something that is an active field of theoretical research, and it’s going on.
Bret Weinstein: I must say I have become something of a skeptic of mathematical modeling because it suffers from two kinds of errors that are pretty obvious.
Dennis: It may sound picky, but I would point out here that saying something like “these errors are pretty obvious”, that’s problematic, because like Popper said, the truth is hard to come by. To him they may be obvious, but it again casts him in this light of he knows what he’s talking about, and anyone in the audience who doesn’t understand it now has a harder time questioning it or even daring to question it, because they should, you know, if you say that this stuff is obvious, and this is mathematical biology, which is not at all obvious, then the audience is going to think that if they don’t understand it, they’re dumb. And that’s really sad. I think that shouldn’t be the case.
Bret Weinstein: One is it will sometimes give you an answer that is not viable in reality. In other, in other words, if we were to mathematically model the way a sphere sits on a razor, as long as there are no other forces input into this system, we will be told that a sphere will balance on a razor. But we all know that a sphere doesn’t balance on a razor. Right? Mathematical modeling will tell you that a cup of coffee in a room will take an infinite amount of time to equalize, that it will approach the temperature of the room, and the room will approach the temperature of the coffee, but they will never reach each other. We know that this isn’t the case. So mathematical modeling has a way in which it can fool us into thinking that we have the right answer when we don’t.
Dennis: This stuff reminds me of the work that David Deutsch has done on Zeno’s paradox. It’s the thing about the turtle and, I think it was Achilles. So if they’re both sprinting and you give the turtle a head start, Achilles, so Zeno argued, would never overtake the turtle, because in order to do that, he would first have to go halfway toward the turtle, then a quarter of the way, then another half of that remaining distance, and another half, and so forth. So he would approach it ever more, but never quite get to it. And I think, though I’m shaky on this, but I think David Deutsch’s solution to this was basically the trick or the issue behind all of Zeno’s paradoxes was that he was confusing mathematical infinity with physical infinity.
Again, I’m shaky on this. Don’t quote me on it. I’ll try to find the paper. I think there’s a paper, or a transcript of a talk, I should say, that David gave called What is Computation, I think. I’m going to try to find it, and then I’ll link to it in the description.
But yeah, stuff like the temperature of the coffee and the temperature of the room approaching each other but never reaching each other, even though in physical reality, what Bret is saying here is that we know that eventually they do equalize. They are eventually the same. This is the difference between mathematics and the physical world that I think David Deutsch is speaking of there. So these are problems that have been solved.
Bret Weinstein: And the other problem is that these mathematical models very frequently have so many parameters in them that you can match any natural behavior even if the model isn’t the reason that the natural behavior is what it is. So I’m a little actually surprised to hear you defend...
Richard Dawkins: But the remedy for that is better mathematical models. It’s not throwing out mathematical models altogether.
Bret Weinstein: Well, I don’t know. I had a mentor in graduate school who was himself a mathematician. And he said something striking to me one day. He said that math is the language we resort to when we don’t know how to explain something. And so I would argue, yes, mathematical models can reinforce an explanation that is itself sensible. But if we don’t have an explanation that’s actually satisfying, the fact that we have a mathematical model that suggests it, I don’t find especially compelling, because there are lots of ways you can get there.
Richard Dawkins: Well, to go back to what you first started saying about the difficulty with the Zahavi theory, that the female inflicts on, the way you put it was right, the female inflicts upon her offspring the handicap as well as the benefit. I mean, that’s exactly what I said in The Selfish Gene when I ridiculed the Zahavi theory, and I was wrong. Because my student, Alan Grafen, who’s now a fellow professor at Oxford, did produce a mathematical model which does show that, as a matter of fact, the Zahavi theory can work. And I was wrong, everybody else was wrong.
And Grafen showed that we were wrong by producing a mathematical model which shows that the Zahavi handicap theory can work. And I, not being a mathematician myself, have to bow to that. I understand the model and I think it works. I think it’s a very good one, and I ate humble pie. I said I was wrong and my student Alan Grafen was right.
Bret Weinstein: Well, but I think you are too hasty to accept that you were wrong. And in fact, I’m not certain of this, it’s been a while since I have read it, but if I’m correct, what you said about Zahavi in The Selfish Gene was that this didn’t, am I right that you said it didn’t sound like the way natural selection works?
Richard Dawkins: I think I was a bit ruder about it than that.
Bret Weinstein: That’s likely.
Richard Dawkins: But I’m not quite sure what, I mean, how could you possibly argue the case without, I mean, there are some cases where you...
Dennis: The audio is cut here, and I don’t know why.
Richard Dawkins: I’ve, on the whole, not used mathematics myself, and I’ve done verbal arguments. And so I ought to be agreeing with you about this, but there are times when I have to say a verbal argument simply isn’t enough. You’ve got to actually do the sums.
Bret Weinstein: Well, I think a verbal argument has to be proven out by data.
Dennis: This is a grave error that Weinstein just committed, saying that you would have to prove a verbal argument through the use of data. Data can’t prove theories, be they verbal or otherwise. It doesn’t really matter. You can use data, through some other theories, to decide between guess theories, but you can never use data to prove anything. So what he’s looking for here is certainty, and this is reminiscent of the scientific consensus that he was looking for earlier.
There’s a little bit of justificationism in the background here, or not so much in the background, rather in the foreground in this case, that is a grave epistemological error. All we want to do is guess good theories, and then we can use data sometimes, not always, to adjudicate between them. But what Bret is looking for here is not going to work. And that was, of course, explained by Popper in his several books.
Bret Weinstein: And one way to get data, I have to say, not my favorite, but one way to get data is to generate a model that is sufficiently robust that it will spit out a behavior that mirrors what you see. But I also think that, in a sense, the field has adopted this modality of proving things because it has forgotten what to do. That there are actually features of the modern academic environment that effectively rule out the kind of wonderful work that R.A. Fisher did or that you did. And so I think it is very much the fashion to defer to these very powerful tools, but that the powerful tools actually have yet to reveal answers that are compelling and do predict things about nature that we do not know to be true at the point that we build the model.
So if we can take the example of George Williams and his famous paper on the evolution of senescence. The wonderful thing about this paper is that it says, if I, George Williams, am right about the cause of senescence, senescence being the feebleness and inefficiency that accumulates with age. He said, if I’m right about the cause of this, then you will see these patterns in nature. And we knew for a long time, before we could find the genes he had predicted, we knew for a long time that his hypothesis was correct, in other words, that it was a theory, because when we looked at nature, we saw the exact pattern he had described.
And so I’m a fan of that kind of work. You say, well, here’s an observation, here’s the hypothesis that would explain it, and if this hypothesis is correct, this is the pattern we will see in nature, which we don’t know if it’s there yet, and then it’s there.
Richard Dawkins: I think we need to put pause and explain George Williams’ theory of senescence. Because otherwise I don’t think that makes sense. The problem of why natural selection favours growing old and dying of old age. And there had been wrong ideas, things like, it’s for the good of the species that the old ones die off and make way for the young ones, something like that. That doesn’t work, that’s not the way natural selection works.
P.B. Medawar, and then refined by George Williams, came up with a much better genetically based theory, which is that if you imagine a gene, you know that any gene has its effect at a particular time of life, mostly during embryology, but genes go on maturing, making their presence felt at different times of life. Now, if you imagine a gene for giving you a fatal cancer when you’re 10, and another gene for giving you a fatal cancer when you’re 20, another one when you’re 30, another one when you’re 40, another one when you’re 50, etc., which one of them is going to get through to the next generation?
A gene that gives you cancer and kills you when you’re 60 has already got through to the next generation by the time it kills you. A gene that gives you cancer when you’re 10 and kills you does not get through to the next generation. So there’ll be natural selection in favor of late-acting fatal or sub-fatal genes. That was the Medawar version of the theory.
The Williams version of the theory was a nice refinement of that, which is that the genes are modified by other genes. And so any gene which has a good effect when you’re young, makes you fit when you’re young but kills you when you’re old, is likely to survive, and the reverse is not likely to survive. So there’s going to be a pressure in favour of perhaps rushing around and expending all your energy when you’re young in order to get your genes into the next generation when you’re young, at the expense of becoming more likely to die when you’re old. So that’s a rather bad summation of the Williams theory, but now we need to go back to it.
Bret Weinstein: No, it’s pretty good, actually. I don’t know if you know that I worked on this puzzle in graduate school.
Richard Dawkins: I’m sorry, I didn’t know that.
Bret Weinstein: So George Williams, when a gene has two effects, it’s called a pleiotropy. And George Williams’ theory, which was an improvement, Medawar’s theory was very good.
Dennis: The audio jumps again here. I don’t know why. It’s unclear how much time has passed, what they’ve been discussing.
Bret Weinstein: Is the place that you begin to understand what history really is, and it actually lends a great deal of power to your point about the need to rebel against selfish replicators.
Richard Dawkins: Very much so, yes.
Bret Weinstein: The Second World War.
Richard Dawkins: Yes.
Bret Weinstein: Right? Even the terminology. You had the fatherland effectively raping Mother Russia.
Dennis: What Bret is talking about there is the Germans refer to their country as the fatherland. And so he’s talking about the conflict in World War II between Germany and Russia. But he doesn’t really make that clear. He just assumes that people know that Germans call their country fatherland, which I don’t think is a fair assumption to make.
And this is going to get wild. I’m just telling you now. Yeah, just wait for it.
Bret Weinstein: I mean, that’s even the terminology, right? So what this was was a lineage-level phenomenon in which a population went after two other populations. One that was internal to its borders or its near neighbors. And one population that was distant but had a great many resources. But the point is, understood from the perspective of German genes, vile as these behaviors were, they were completely comprehensible from the level of fitness.
It was abhorrent and unacceptable, but understandable, that Germany should have viewed its Jewish population as a source of resources. If you viewed Jews as non-people, then whatever resources they had could be appropriated for German genes. And likewise, the future of Germany lies in Russia. All of the resources of Russia. And how many million is it? 20 million Russians it took to turn the German war machine around.
So what you have are these population-against-population conflicts. If you view it as group selection, it makes no sense. But if you view them as lineages, it makes a great deal of sense. And the belief structures that caused people to step onto battlefields and fight were clearly comprehensible as adaptations of the lineages in question.
Dennis: Just to make clear what Bret is arguing here, I think when he invokes the term lineage, he’s talking about genes and how genes spread over the generations. And so basically what he’s trying to do here, he’s trying to give as an explanation for German aggression in World War II genes and the behavior that these genes coded for. And he’s trying to explain why, say, Nazis killed Jews by invoking genes. And he’s trying to explain the war between Germany and Russia by invoking genes. So he’s saying that there is something in genes, in German genes in particular, that motivated them to kill Jews and to start a war against Russia.
Richard Dawkins: I think nationalism might be an even greater evil than religion, and I’m not sure that it’s actually very helpful to talk about it in Darwinian terms. I think it’s, perhaps this might be a case where we do need to defer a little bit to historians and non-biologists and think about it in other ways.
Bret Weinstein: Why? I’m curious as to why you’d be resistant.
Dennis: I have a tremendous amount of respect for Richard Dawkins for how patient and generous he is right now with Bret Weinstein. Note also how Bret doesn’t just speak clear English sentences. He doesn’t ask, why are you resistant? He says, I’m curious as to why you would be resistant. Now, this may seem off topic, but I do think it’s important how these people speak, especially because they’re addressing each other in front of an audience.
I’m guessing this is lingo that Bret picked up in academia, and I’m guessing that talking like that is a meme that spreads because it lends an air of authority and it creates this impression that you know what you’re talking about. Bret might very well know what he’s talking about. I don’t want to insinuate anything there. But he could just say, why are you resistant? It would be easier to understand. It would be much clearer. I think he’s not doing anyone a favor by speaking in this way.
Richard Dawkins: Because I think human affairs are so complicated and so, although ultimately we are evolved creatures, our human affairs, our historical affairs, our social affairs are so distantly related upon a superstructure of biology that it’s probably better not to try to explain them in simple biological terms.
Bret Weinstein: Ah, so I think this is then why we disagree on the importance of this, and I would say it’s absolutely vital for us to confront this in biological terms. If one imagines that we are remote from evolution by virtue of the fact that cultural evolution has taken over and is not furthering the interests of the genes, then this does become a complicated matter that is uniquely human. If, on the other hand, human beings are engaged in a fundamentally biological phenomenon that they do not consciously understand, then in order to confront it, I really believe we have to look at what we are, and that your point about rebelling against the selfish replicators is the key.
I mean, here’s my feeling. If I’m a robot that is programmed to be willing to put other people in a gas chamber under the right circumstances, but I as a conscious being find that idea horrifying, then I as a conscious being have to look at that program and say, under no circumstances will I be party to it. I don’t care if it’s biologically advantageous. It’s not for me. And so the ability to resist the will of the replicators, I think, requires us to stare in the face what role this has played in our history up until the present day.
Richard Dawkins: I think we agree about that. I think we’ve run out of time, haven’t we?
Bret Weinstein: Well, that’s a question for the audience, really.
Dennis: I’m cutting out a part here where they discuss whether or not they want to do a Q&A or keep talking. They eventually decide to keep discussing.
Bret Weinstein: Okay, I don’t know if you wanted to respond to the last point. What I was saying is effectively that we must, as ugly as it is, we must confront what we are programmed for if we are to resist a recurrence of those patterns in the future.
Richard Dawkins: Okay, let’s let that one go.
Bret Weinstein: Okay, we’ll let that one go.
Dennis: I was pretty bummed that Dawkins didn’t want to respond to that. I don’t know why he didn’t want to respond to it. Maybe because they had this whole back and forth about whether or not to keep discussing or whether to do a Q&A, so maybe he forgot some points. There’s a lot of pressure on these guys up there on stage. I would have loved to know what he thinks about this, because I don’t know if Dawkins and I agree on this.
I do remember, it’s been a while since I read The Selfish Gene, but I do remember him saying something to the effect of, you know, replicators are selfish. That’s what the title of his book refers to. And all they want to do, they don’t really want anything because they’re not conscious beings or anything, but all a replicator does is it spreads. It just makes copies of itself. So, or that’s what a self-reproducing replicator does.
And he, I think he, if I remember correctly, he says that, this can lead both to selfish behavior in individual organisms, but it can also lead to altruistic behavior in individual organisms. It’s just whatever behavior the replicator codes for, whatever behavior the genes code for that helps them spread. In some species it might be, might be the case, or in some environments, whatever it may be, it might be the case that a more selfish behavior on the part of the individual is good for its genes to spread. And it might be the case that in some environments or in some species or whatever, it may be better for individuals to have a more altruistic characteristic.
What I’m unclear on is whether Dawkins thinks that this selfishness of replicators can rub off, so to speak, on individual organisms, like if that’s sort of the default state. Certainly people have interpreted The Selfish Gene to mean that, that this is somehow where human selfishness comes from. And I do think that Dawkins argues for altruism in The Selfish Gene, that people should be altruistic and not selfish. That’s a whole can of worms I’m not going to get into now. I disagree with him there.
But I do wonder, what he would have said to Bret just now, because what Bret is positing here is that there is a German gene or a collection of German genes that commanded that they try to exterminate the Jews. That makes absolutely no sense to me, because what you would have to explain then is how this adaptation arose over time. It means that there must have been an advantage to genes that happened to code for this trait in the past. And we’re not just talking 100 years ago or 200 years ago. We’re talking long periods over which this gene would have been beneficial. Evolution is a gradual process. This doesn’t happen, this doesn’t happen very quickly. So why on earth any population of genes should be able to spread better because it codes for xenophobia or racism, that’s totally not clear to me.
This is not to mention that even if there were such a gene, that people can easily override their genetic influence. David Deutsch has spoken about this in at least a couple interviews, I think, where he says, you know, people jump out of airplanes for fun. So, like, you can have an inborn fear of height, but then you can exploit that and use it to your advantage to have fun and, like, overcome your fears or something. And I think that’s true. And there’s other examples, like people fast, people go celibate.
I think Bret and Richard, they talk about this a little bit later on, but I don’t think Bret ever explains how it is that people can override this. He does seem to grant that there’s a conscious part of us that can override genetic influence. But he doesn’t explain why that is possible or how.
But yeah, just to get back to just saying that Germans did what they did, or Nazi Germans, I should clarify, did what they did because of their genes, that seems absolutely bonkers to me. They did what they did because they had bad ideas. This was a war of ideas. This was not a war of genes.
Bret Weinstein: All right. Number six, adaptation can directly explain obligate homosexuality, suicide and celibacy in humans.
Richard Dawkins: Well, I think we do have, as Darwinians, we do have an obligation to try to explain things which are frequent enough to be not regarded as mere aberrations. And so homosexuality in humans is frequent enough that it... And indeed it is a genetic thing. And so we cannot duck our responsibility to try to... So at least it deserves to have a Darwinian explanation. We know that there’s a genetic component from such things as twin studies. And we know that it’s frequent enough that it’s not just a result of recurrent mutation.
Dennis: I would have loved for Dawkins to explain how we know from those twin studies that there’s a genetic component to homosexuality. I’m a bit surprised at that. I just Googled that, apparently there is homosexuality in the animal kingdom. I did not expect that. Because from the gene’s-eye view, homosexuality seems like a really bad idea, just like suicide would be a bad idea for a gene. If a gene ever finds itself in an organism that is homosexual, then it has found a dead end. It won’t be able to replicate. So there should be selective pressure to avoid homosexuality, just to keep the genes spreading.
But that discussion in nature and in animals is different from the discussion in human homosexuality. Because, like I said, human behavior is driven by ideas. The genes may give a starting point, and maybe that’s all that Dawkins is referring to here, because he just said there’s a genetic component. So genes may give a starting point, but then later on people can change, that they can disregard that influence if they want to. It may not necessarily be easy, but they can.
So homosexuality, to me, that strikes me as a particular sexual preference. And this is not a popular view, I realize that, but I would imagine that people can change it. I’m not in favor of those conversion therapy things, because people are being forced to attend, and I don’t think they work. But I do think that people can change their sexual preferences, and homosexuality, like, the sexual orientation, is one of these things that they could change, even if it may be hard to do.
But people have all kinds of other sexual preferences that we would never explain in terms of genetic disposition, even. So, for example, some people have fetishes. Like, maybe somebody has a foot fetish. That’s a, that’s a popular fetish. And why, how would we explain that through genetic influence? It doesn’t seem that any genes would have had an advantage for our ancestors to like each other’s feet. And it also doesn’t make sense. So let’s say somebody has a fetish for piercings. Piercings weren’t around until recently. So there’s no way genes could encode any knowledge about piercings. And yet people have these fetishes. Or maybe somebody likes, maybe somebody likes women that, who wear stiletto shoes, right? Like, I would, I would find it really difficult to explain that in terms of genes.
In the animal kingdom, we could maybe explain homosexuality, it just occurred to me, we could maybe explain homosexuality in the sense of, if, if a small minority of individuals in the species enact homosexual behavior, that must somehow help the genes of that species on the whole to spread. I’m not saying it’s better for the species. That’s important. I’m just saying it would help more genes of that species spread somehow. Maybe it makes males more in demand because now they’re more scarce or something like that. That could maybe explain homosexuality in nature.
But again, in people, I think those are ideas. I would agree with Dawkins that there could be a genetic starting point or a genetic component, as he says, but these ideas are not immutable. These are changeable, and I think they’re probably developed by the human during his lifetime, not before he’s born.
Bret Weinstein: So yes, there has to be some sort of Darwinian explanation. And there’s also a fascinating pattern that also suggests a Darwinian explanation, although confusing. So I would point to the older brother right-hand rule.
Richard Dawkins: Yes.
Bret Weinstein: The more older brothers you have, the more likely you are to be gay, but only so long as you’re right-handed. Right? That’s a very interesting pattern that has been replicated multiple times. And it suggests that there’s something going on with homosexuality more than some failure due to novelty. It suggests that there’s some sort of structure to it and a meaning that we haven’t yet figured out. So how about suicide? Do you see that one as explicable?
Richard Dawkins: Well, I haven’t thought about that to the same extent. Have you thought about it?
Bret Weinstein: Yes.
Richard Dawkins: Okay. I can easily think of psychological explanations and memetic explanations, perhaps. Genetic explanations for suicide, do you have them?
Bret Weinstein: Well, I think in principle many of these things come back to the same couple of places where our field has instantiated a bad assumption. And so the assumption about individual selection, where lineage selection might be a more powerful concept, has caused us, I think, to miss the boat on all three of these characteristics.
What I would say is, let’s just take an example of the Middle East, for example. Let’s say you have two populations in the Middle East and both of them correctly recognize that 500 years from now they are not both likely to be there, that it is likely to be one or the other but not both. Were that the case, then any fitness that was realized in the present day would be more or less meaningless if you were in the population that blinked out 200 years from now. So you would find a rational investment in behaviors that discounted individual fitness and prioritized lineage fitness. In other words, you would see extraordinary levels of self-sacrifice in the interest of ensuring that the population to which the individual doing the sacrifice belonged was the one that continued to exist.
I don’t know how clear that was, but the basic idea is in extraordinary circumstances, like, for example, a piece of land that isn’t getting any bigger and is fully inhabited and has competing lineages that cannot simply live peaceably together, that suicidal self-sacrifice might be rational. Now again, naturalistic fallacy being what it is, just because something is doesn’t mean it ought to be, and I’m not defending it as a good thing, but I’m saying, can we understand it rationally?
If we think about adaptation occurring at the lineage level, I think it’s not hard to see cases where suicide, I mean, really it’s one step past getting on a ship and going over the horizon to see if you can find a new landmass that nobody’s discovered. That’s a near-suicidal behavior that’s somewhat comprehensible. Actual suicide can make sense if the circumstances are extraordinary enough.
And I would also say, closer to home, that if we look at cases where people commit suicide in our own culture, very frequently they are beset by the sense that they are beyond worthless, that they have no value, that their existence is simply taking up resource. And so you can imagine that this could be a matter of kin selection or lineage selection, that if you, and I think most people who believe that in our culture are not calculating correctly, they have bad data on what value they might contribute, but nonetheless, were you to be triggered to imagine that you had no value and that you were simply burning up resources, then this is a rational course of action.
Dennis: I just looked up kin selection. According to Wikipedia, quote, “kin selection is the evolutionary strategy that favors the reproductive success of an organism’s relatives even at a cost to the organism’s own survival and reproduction. Kin altruism can look like altruistic behavior whose evolution is driven by kin selection.”
So I think this, yeah, Bret invokes it here in the right context of suicide. I suppose suicide would be a particular instance of kin selection. But he, first of all, he doesn’t explain what kin selection is. He just assumes again that people already know, or maybe he doesn’t assume, maybe he just forgot, but either way, it would be better to, to explain it. And, I would be skeptical of kin selection because that sounds like a theory about individual selection. Right, because it’s speaking in terms of organisms and their relatives. It’s not speaking in terms of the replicator, the gene. But the unit of selection is always the gene. So I’m not sure if kin selection is necessarily a sound concept.
Lineage selection I’m less familiar with, so I’m not going to comment on that, but I have the same skepticism there. It sounds a little bit like selection of individuals, unless you’re specifically talking about the selection of lineages of genes, and even then it’s not the lineages that are being selected, it’s just the genes that are being selected. Anyway, I guess I did just comment on it.
Richard Dawkins: I do not think it’s helpful to couch this kind of explanation in Darwinian terms. Darwinian evolution is about the natural selection of replicators. And the primary replicators we’re talking about are genes. And the vast majority of biological evolution, and you’ve been advocating the priority of this genetic selection, producing bodies and brains the way they are. And now we come on to things like nationalism, things like individuals sacrificing themselves for the sake of the long-term future of their lineage, their society, their nation.
This is not Darwinism. This is something else. This is a complicated mixture of human-level affairs, which historians deal with, sociologists deal with, psychologists deal with. This is not Darwinism. It’s not helpful to try to couch this in what sounds like Darwinian terms.
Bret Weinstein: Well, let me ask you a question. Let’s just see where it is that we disagree. My claim is that if it is true, and I obviously can’t say if it is or it isn’t, but if it is true that things like xenophobia, genocide, suicide are products of adaptive evolution, that in order to address these things going forward in a useful way, understanding their nature is likely to be beyond helpful and may even be essential.
So to give one example, let’s say that the impulse to genocide is something that lurks inside human beings awaiting certain indicators that it is the moment for that program to be triggered. Were that the case, you would want people to engage that question ahead of time, when they were in possession of their full faculties, and to recognize that they might have a program within them that violates the values that they believe are their, their guide.
Richard Dawkins: Yes, but I think I would prefer to say that these impulses are byproducts of something primitive and evolved. So something like genocide. We know that chimpanzees, for example, do practice genocide against rival groups of chimpanzees. One can make a genetic evolution case that says something like this. In our wild ancestry, using the Hamilton idea of living in villages, living in small bands, the companions that you know, that are familiar to you from day to day, everybody you know is a relative, strangers or not.
And so killing strangers, genocide, killing neighboring bands of people, like happens in some parts of the New Guinea highlands, for example, that could be regarded as a byproduct of genetic natural selection, and something like the Nazi atrocities could be regarded as a manifestation of that genetically evolved tendency. But it’s in a totally different context. And of course I agree with you that we need to resist, we need to rebel against the selfish genes. But I prefer not to talk about the things that we do in our modern society in a sort of straightforward biological way, but rather to say these are relics, by-product relics of our genetic past.
And one can do this all the time, and I think that we do it a lot. We do things like the desire for business executives to have a bigger, thicker office carpet, that kind of thing. This is all, you can interpret that in a sort of biological way as representing something like something that came from our biological past. But you have to be very careful when you do it. And I don’t, I think it’s very often not very helpful to try to apply Darwinian ideas directly to the sorts of things that we get in modern society, whether it’s horrible mechanized warfare or executives demanding bigger desks or whatever it is. I just think we’ve got to be very careful in applying. I mean, I am in favor of evolutionary psychologists who do this kind of thing, but I think they do do it in a careful way. And I think we’ve got to be very cautious in the way we do it.
Dennis: Yeah, so I agree with Dawkins here that we should be very careful to apply biological neo-Darwinian evolution to human behavior. I think there’s much more to be said about human behavior. So when it comes to, I want to try and kind of expand on this. So when it comes to animal behavior and plant behavior, there’s something important to realize, and Dawkins laid this out in The Selfish Gene, which is animals and plants and any kind of organism is what he calls a survival machine. They are adaptations. They are sort of these shields and machines that genes build around themselves so that they can spread better. That’s what animals are. And that’s what plants are too.
And he also explained that genes not only have control over an animal’s or plant’s physiology, its bodily makeup, but they also have influence over the behavior of an animal. Plants not so much, because they don’t really have any behavior, except for some plants maybe. But let’s say the hunting instinct of a wolf, that is also genetically given, and how to run, how to snap your jaw. These are all things that are genetically given in a wolf, for example. And this is true of all animals.
I don’t think animals are conscious. I don’t think that there’s anything going on in an animal’s mind. I know this is unpopular and controversial. I don’t need to get further into this right now, but I think it’s perfectly conceivable that animals really are just these machines that do the genes’ bidding.
Now, for humans, I think this is utterly different. I’m trying to gauge what direction I should come at it from. So, first of all, what Richard Dawkins has already alluded to, and I think he’s going to get more into this later, is that memes play an important role in explaining human behavior. So like I said earlier, the reason Germany attacked Russia was because of ideas. It wasn’t that Nazi Germans had certain genes, and these genes kind of, you know, clicked on, and from then on, they turned into these monstrous people that wanted to kill Russians.
The reason Nazi Germany did what they did is because the memeplex of national socialism managed to spread through the population of Germany. And it managed to spread sufficiently so that it could control the collective behavior of the German people, and that is what led to the horrible outcome of the war. It’s not that there were any genes involved in this, and I highly doubt that people, even Germans and others, are even born with suicidal genes or, you know, genocidal genes or any other stuff like that. I don’t think that’s the case.
There could be a case made for that, like Richard Dawkins was saying, I think, in some chimps, they have kind of tribal wars or whatever he was saying. I could imagine that in animals. I cannot imagine that in humans, and I’ll get to why that is later. But yeah, if we want to explain human behavior, memes, just ideas generally, are hugely important.
So memes are ideas that spread between people. This is also one of Dawkins’ discoveries in The Selfish Gene. That’s when he first presented it. The meme, these are ideas that spread between people. So there’s replication going on, and at every step along the way, they might be changed by the recipient, or quote-unquote recipient, because it’s still a creative act. And so memes change over time. This is how they evolve. And if a meme ever changes in a way that makes it better able to replicate further, well, then that meme will spread. So it’s all very similar to genes.
There are significant differences between meme evolution and gene evolution, but it’s just important to realize that memes are much more powerful than genes, and this goes back to what I said earlier, you know, borrowing what David Deutsch has said, you know, people using memes, or using ideas generally, they can override their genes’ influence very easily. So yeah, I would completely reject what Weinstein is arguing for here.
Now, why is it that people can so easily ignore the influence of their genes? So this can be answered within the neo-Darwinian theory of the mind. If you’d like more detail on it, I’m just going to lay it out briefly here, but if you’d like more detail on it, check out the previous episode. Basically, the neo-Darwinian theory of the mind is an attempt to explain what goes on in a mind, and it builds on Karl Popper’s idea that human knowledge evolves.
So as humans learn things, they create new knowledge. That is synonymous. Those two things are synonymous. And they do so by solving problems. And Popper conjectured that they do so by conjecturing solutions and then trying to criticize those solutions. And if they ever fail to criticize a solution, then they tentatively adopt it, and then they look for the next problem. And this interplay of conjecture and criticism is what Popper saw in strict analogy to the mutation of genes in the biosphere and the selection of genes in the biosphere. So conjecture is the sort of the human counterpart to genetic mutation, and criticism is the human counterpart to natural selection. So there’s still mutation and selection going on in the mind, it’s just not genetic.
And so the neo-Darwinian theory of the mind builds further on this, and the way it does that is it says there is at least one, maybe only one, self-replicating idea present at birth in a human mind, and because that self-replicating idea is going to replicate, it creates a pool of ideas, a so-called idea pool. And that pool of ideas will consist of ideas that all want to spread through the mind. And evolution will occur because replication is not perfect forever. And so these different ideas, even though initially they may all be the same or only very similar, they will sort of spread and grow apart in a sort of tree-like fashion, just like an evolutionary tree in biology.
So that is how people create new ideas. We have ideas that aren’t genetically given, and we have these new ideas all the time, like ideas about how to write, how to read, how to build cars. None of that stuff is genetically given, and so the question is, where does it come from? And I think the neo-Darwinian theory of the mind explains this well. Through evolution of self-replicating ideas that happens within a single mind.
It’s important to disambiguate there between these ideas and memes, because memes are also ideas that replicate, but they specifically refer to ideas that replicate between people, whereas the neo-Darwinian theory of the mind refers to ideas that replicate within a single mind.
Now, I said earlier that the reason national socialism was successful in shaping the behavior of so many Germans was because the meme of national socialism, or the entire memeplex, so a collection of these memes that collaborate in order to spread, managed to spread through the German population. And so from that point on, it had influence. And so this is how we can explain group behavior, I think. Meme evolution, meme theory gives us an excellent tool to do that. But then there’s still the question of, okay, so why did individual Germans support or reject national socialism? There were plenty of people who rejected the idea.
And this discussion, by the way, national socialism is just an example. We could do this for any idea or meme or memeplex. So the question is, why did individuals do that? Or, to go back to Richard Dawkins’ example from earlier, why is there a boss who wants a bigger desk? For all of these questions, why does somebody believe a certain thing, why does somebody want a certain thing, it’s because that idea managed to spread through his mind. I think that is the explanation. So that explanation, I think, works well, and it doesn’t involve genes at all.
I think genes provide a very minimal starting point, and maybe some instincts and so forth. Again, I doubt that people are born with any genocidal or suicidal ideas. If somebody wants to commit suicide, that is because the idea of committing suicide evolved in his mind and managed to spread through his mind at the expense of other ideas that would have prevented him from committing suicide, that would have helped him appreciate life. So this is also relevant for psychotherapy when it comes to suicide prevention and so forth. But yes, I think the neo-Darwinian theory of the mind can tell us a lot there.
And I should also clarify that when Richard Dawkins says we should be careful in applying neo-Darwinian evolution to this modern-day human behavior, when he says neo-Darwinian there, he is talking about biological evolution. But memetic evolution, the evolution of memes, also occurs according to neo-Darwinian mechanisms, and that is the same for the evolution of ideas within a single mind. This also occurs according to neo-Darwinian mechanisms. So the neo-Darwinian theory of the mind is called that not because it has anything to do with biology, but because the focus is on replication and the replicator’s-eye view of evolution. That is why it’s called the neo-Darwinian theory of the mind.
Bret Weinstein: Well, you and I are in 100% agreement that we need to be extremely careful in applying evolutionary logic. And it is possible to get carried away. I, for example, would not argue that we can apply evolutionary logic to anything so new that we don’t know if it stands the test of time. So I have a test of adaptation that just simply tells you whether or not you are on solid ground to presume that something is adaptive. And it involves looking at whether something has a complexity, whether it has a cost, a variable cost that could be reduced, and whether it persists over evolutionary time.
So wanting a bigger desk is, I think you and I would agree, certainly a manifestation of something evolved, but it’s very hard to analyze desks with Darwinian tools because desks are new. But something like genocide is not new. Warfare is not new. And so these things are complex, expensive. We’re seeing a history that goes into antiquity and beyond, and that, I believe, not only gives us license to apply Darwinian tools, but I would say, A, it is the most parsimonious explanation.
Dennis: So Bret just invoked Occam’s razor. He was saying that it would be the most parsimonious explanation. Parsimonious means that it’s economical, or there’s no extraneous features to the explanation. And it’s not entirely wrong that you don’t want any extraneous features in an explanation, but just because an explanation is parsimonious, that doesn’t mean that it’s good.
So I want to quote from David Deutsch’s The Beginning of Infinity. This is chapter one, where he talks about Occam’s razor, and I quote: “A common way in which an explanation can be bad is by containing superfluous features or arbitrariness, and sometimes removing those yields a good explanation. This has given rise to a misconception known as ‘Occam’s razor’,” skipping some, “namely that one should always seek the ‘simplest explanation’. One statement of it is ‘Do not multiply assumptions beyond necessity.’ However, there are plenty of very simple explanations that are nevertheless easily variable,” and skipping some, “and while assumptions ‘beyond necessity’ make a theory bad by definition, there have been many mistaken ideas of what is ‘necessary’ in a theory.” End quote.
So yeah, invoking Occam’s razor is very common among scientists, and advocating for parsimony is very trendy among scientists. And there’s some use in it. It’s a little bit useful, but what we’re really looking for, and you can read more about that in the first chapter of The Beginning of Infinity too, what we’re really looking for is good and far-reaching explanations. We want to have bold conjectures. If we limit ourselves to parsimonious conjectures, then we’re not going to come up with very good explanations.
Bret Weinstein: And B, it is our best hope of ending these patterns permanently. If I didn’t believe that, I would be much less enthusiastic about what is revealed by these analyses. I would say they are justified, but I might not be a champion of doing it, and I might not be so interested in doing it personally. But to the extent that I would love to see an end to genocide, I think facing what it actually appears to be is essential.
Dennis: If Bret really wants to stop genocide from happening, then I think he should shift his focus from genes onto memes and how they spread. I think meme theory will be his best bet there, if that is his intention.
Richard Dawkins: Okay, but suppose... But suppose you take the example of the Nazi invasion of the lands to the east, which you did before. You’ve got a nation taking a decision, which is a dictator and advisors and a parliament. It’s a complicated matter of a state taking a decision to invade another state using modern weapons, and using the weapons of diplomacy to argue the case in international courts and so on. And then you’ve got the individual soldiers going out there and killing people.
And the psychological motives of the individual soldiers are going to be so different from those... I mean, they’re not the ones who are actually taking the decision to go and invade Poland. They are doing quite different things. They’re obeying their officers. They’re perhaps giving vent to revenge motives because their comrade was killed in a previous battle or something of that sort. These are very, very complicated mixtures of motives, psychological motives.
Dennis: What Dawkins is trying to give here is an explanation for, I mean, he’s making the case that there is a lot more to it than genes, which I agree with, and that there are psychological factors, which I also agree with. I wouldn’t put it so much in terms of psychology. I would put it more in terms of, like I said, evolution that happens in a mind.
So Dawkins is giving examples of why a soldier is going to war, and that decision might involve, I don’t know, maybe he wants to defend his country, or he’s motivated by ideas of national socialism, or maybe he’s just being conscripted and it’s not really his choice.
So if it is his choice, then I think, again, the neo-Darwinian theory of the mind is the better explanation. The primary reason anyone does anything is because the idea telling him to do so managed to spread through his mind. Then there may be secondary reasons. Like, the reason why it managed to spread through his mind is because his mind values, let’s say, pride of the fatherland or something. But again, that is just describing the environment, that mind that provided the environment that allowed the idea of going to war to spread within that mind.
So I think the reason why ideas spread through populations of people is very similar to how ideas and why ideas spread through a single mind. And in both cases, the behavior of that group and the behavior of that individual are determined by the ideas that manage to spread through them.
Richard Dawkins: Yes, they are, all of them, products of brains which were honed by natural selection.
Dennis: I realize I’m not giving Dawkins a whole lot of time to talk here, but note just real quick that he’s speaking of brains rather than minds. I’ve criticized that often, not just with Dawkins, in the past. I think we can basically ignore discussing the brain, and we should focus solely on the mind. And the reason that is is because of computational universality. So here I appeal to the Deutschian notion that once you have a computationally universal system, a computationally universal hardware, what that hardware looks like, the hardware specifics, other than memory and processing power, don’t matter, because you can just run any software in it, period. And that’s the same with the brain. We know that the brain is a computer, and we know that it must be a universal computer because human beings and their abilities and all the ideas that they can have are just so far off the mark that in order to support this repertoire, their brains must be universal computers.
And furthermore, again, within the context of the neo-Darwinian theory of the mind, all the relevant explanatory power lies in the realm of the mind, not in the realm of the brain. That theory never refers to the brain; it only refers to the mind. And this is also important because the whole point of trying to understand, or part of the point of trying to understand the mind is that within the context of the project of AGI, artificial general intelligence, we want to replicate that on a computer. And a computer, by which I mean, like, a desktop computer or a laptop, is, in terms of hardware, utterly different from a brain, but it could nonetheless run all the same programs.
So it wouldn’t even make sense to explain something like, why does a person believe one thing over another? How does knowledge evolve in a person’s mind? It wouldn’t make sense to explain that in terms of hardware, and it would defeat the purpose of trying to replicate that on a computer. Any explanation of intelligence and why people do some things over others has to live on the appropriate level of emergence, and that level of emergence is mental, not brain-related.
And what this means also in terms of evolution is, yes, biological evolution determines genetically the architecture of the brain. But because that brain then runs software, and because one such piece of software contains an instruction that makes a single idea self-replicate, sooner or later those ideas evolve away, actually pretty quickly. They evolve away from what the original genetic instructions were. And so that’s why it’s, I just think it’s completely misleading, basically, to think in terms of the brain, not in terms of the mind, because it leads to a bunch of different problems.
Richard Dawkins: But I don’t think it’s helpful to unite them all and say, well, this is all one biological impulse to do something. There are different things at different levels.
Bret Weinstein: Well, I do think you’re right about that in one level. So if we look at the genocide between Hutus and Tutsis.
Dennis: Bret is again referring to something that most people will not know what he’s talking about. I certainly don’t. I just looked it up on Wikipedia, but I’d have to read up on it before I really know what he’s talking about.
Bret Weinstein: These distinctions were actually phenotypically imposed. In other words, this is the rare case where you have a genocidal impulse that appears to be triggered by the artificial, and now it may mirror an actual lineage phenomenon, but what you had was people measuring noses and eyes and things like this and imposing the sense that these are your people and those are the enemy, and it triggered a genocide.
On the other hand, what I think we need to be aware of, and this is a dangerous topic to open, but I would say during the last presidential election, we had a cynical fella who began to intone some of the same ideas that lead people to some sort of nationalistic fervor. And to the extent that that program that is looking for the moment in history at which this is the correct way to behave, that those detectors might have been up and waiting for somebody to use that kind of rhetoric, that we may find ourselves dragged into something we could anticipate but won’t if we don’t confront it.
And that it is much better to understand, for example, that when you move from a phase where you have growth, or something that seems like growth, that makes people feel comfortable, makes them keep their head down, makes them treat their neighbors basically all right, when that breaks down at the point that you run out of growth, the natural impulse is to become tribal and go after those who aren’t so closely related to you. And so to the extent that we can be taken advantage of by a leader who would cynically or otherwise lead us into some sort of tribal warfare, we need to recognize that danger and say, actually, is there a way out of here that is novel? Can we do something that isn’t evolutionary but actually matches the values that we believe ourselves to hold, the values that are defensible?
Richard Dawkins: I think that’s right. I think that it is important to recognize things like tribalism. I think that’s probably a real phenomenon which is important and which can be and is played upon by demagogues.
Dennis: Well, demagogues might exploit tribalistic tendencies in a population, but that doesn’t mean that those tribalistic tendencies are genetic. Those might as well, and as I’ve argued, I think they are idea-based.
Richard Dawkins: And so yes, tribalism and some other things like that, which are important. And when I say that they’re distanced from the biological, some of them are more distanced than others, and some of them are pretty naked, are pretty close to the surface. And I think that the tribalism which is invoked both in the case of the Hutus and Tutsis and in the case of the recent election disaster, that probably is sufficiently close to the surface that it’s not unreasonable to use biological terminology and make and notice resemblances to, say, the battles between New Guinea Highland tribes, that kind of thing.
Bret Weinstein: Good. Well, I guess then that suggests that there is something that I don’t think I’ve seen, which is, is there a program in which people are seeking what are the legitimate boundaries of discussion for Darwinian selection, and when do we move into phenomena that are not amenable or don’t benefit from that kind of perspective?
So I think I hear you and me converging on the idea that this is dangerous territory. It is quite possible to extend it too far, but that there may be great value, if we wish to avoid the worst instincts that human beings have, in understanding what their Darwinian underpinnings are and how we might, you know, in the same manner that you invoke birth control. Family planning is, I think we both agree, contrary to fitness in many cases. How can we take that model where we have stepped away from a biological imperative to increase fitness at all costs and we’ve done something more reasonable, family planning, how can we apply that same kind of logic to things like warfare and genocide and demagoguery?
Richard Dawkins: It is a useful model because contraception is a case where we have stepped back from biology. It shows that we can do it.
Bret Weinstein: Yes. It does, but it also shows us this arbitrary nature of when you can. Because the reason that we can do it with birth control is an accident of evolution, which is that sexual pleasure and sexual reproduction are not synonymous. We have been wired with a program that causes us to seek sexual pleasure in a way that results in reproduction, but because they aren’t the same thing, they can be technologically decoupled, which makes family planning an almost trivial matter. You can engage in it without engaging in a fight with yourself.
Dennis: I think birth control is an interesting example of an instance in which there is competition between genetic replicators, DNA, and memetic replicators, idea-based replicators, because the idea of using birth control will spread through the population of human minds at the expense of the gene’s ability to replicate.
Richard Dawkins: Would you say tribalism has been decoupled in sports, football hooliganism?
Bret Weinstein: Yes, I would say this is a place actually where you see...
Richard Dawkins: Loyalty to your team.
Bret Weinstein: Yes, not necessarily productively, but it is a case in which you see people’s tribal impulses being applied to what is effectively one corporation battling another on a field. I mean, that’s what they are. A corporation buys a bunch of players, another corporation buys one. It’s not like two towns are fighting each other, but people get involved in it like it is. And so, yes, I think it’s a place where it’s been decoupled almost by accident. Have you noticed what soccer players do when they’ve just scored a goal? They throw a spear. They rush around like that.
Richard Dawkins: That’s good. That does seem like what they do.
Bret Weinstein: All right. Shall we move down the list to even more infuriating things? All right. Number seven. I really want to know your reaction to this one. I’ve been waiting all night. Catholics are eusocial. Does everybody in the audience understand what the claim is? That you have a non-reproductive caste within Catholicism. Other religions too, but Catholics are kind to us in that they make everything so elaborate that we can... Worker bees don’t reproduce.
Richard Dawkins: Right.
Bret Weinstein: Priests theoretically don’t.
Dennis: It was good that Bret took a moment to explain what eusocial means.
Bret Weinstein: Yeah, priests theoretically don’t, and neither do nuns.
Richard Dawkins: Well, I think most of them probably don’t. Don’t you agree?
Bret Weinstein: Yes. Yeah. So, all right, the question is, you know, you allege in The Selfish Gene that a celibate clergy is a failure of Darwinian selection. My claim here is that this isn’t a failure, that this is adaptive celibacy, that it serves a lineage-level purpose.
Richard Dawkins: It’s meme-level. That’s what’s going on there.
Dennis: Yeah, so this is the moment where Richard finally kind of stands up to Bret and is like, no, no, no, listen, you’re putting way too much emphasis on genes. These are ideas evolving here.
Bret Weinstein: But if it’s meme-level, then each of those priests and each of those nuns is involved in a spectacular loss of a reproductive opportunity. I mean, this is the argument you lay out. So the question is, why are they so vulnerable to accept? I mean, most people couldn’t forego romance and sex if they tried. And yet you have a group of people that is triggered to avoid these things, and they do so in the service of a bunch of ideas that, yes, are literally false.
Richard Dawkins: A bunch of ideas, that’s exactly right. A bunch of memes. So memes that make some individuals... In Ireland, for example, it has traditionally been a prestigious thing for one member of the family, one brother, to become a priest, a celibate priest. So the priest devotes all his energy to proselytizing and spreading the meme and all the other memes, the better to persuade other Catholics to have more children than they should.
Bret Weinstein: But then that...
Dennis: So Bret is asking here, why do some people devote their lives to being celibate, to not having sex? And the answer, I think, that Richard gives is good. It’s because there are memes that this person has adopted, and those memes tell him to be celibate. And he also gives a reason for why he adopted that meme. So, for example, it was prestigious to be a priest, or for the family it was prestigious to have the, I forget what he said, the eldest son or whatever, to be a priest. So that makes sense. I think that’s a good high-level and common-sense explanation. He became a priest because that was prestigious, and it also makes sense in the context of meme replication.
And if we want to go a little more detailed, sort of a lower level, we, I would add that the reason that this, this person, any particular person who decides to become celibate, why is it that that person decides to become celibate? Well, because the idea of celibacy managed to spread, or the idea of being celibate in particular, managed to spread through his mind at the expense of ideas condoning sex, say, or condoning romance.
Bret Weinstein: Isn’t it interesting that this person who, according to you, is involved in a failure of Darwinism just so happens to behave in a way that his genes are likely to be spread by virtue of the fact that he’s encouraging...
Richard Dawkins: Not his genes, his memes.
Bret Weinstein: No, his genes. He’s part of a lineage.
Richard Dawkins: Oh, as it happens in our... As it... That’s true.
Bret Weinstein: Well, but I mean, this is my claim, is that it is almost always going to be the case in any persistent religion that where you have people engaged in what appears to be some spectacular failure of Darwinism, that they just so happen to be spreading ideas that will result in the genes that are allowing them to fail as Darwinian entities to succeed by the lineage that holds those beliefs.
Richard Dawkins: They devote all their energies to spreading Catholic memes, and they don’t have to bother with the time and responsibilities of the family, so they’re wholly devoted to spreading Catholic memes, including, incidentally, more than incidentally, the meme for celibacy.
Bret Weinstein: Well, they spread the meme for celibacy, which, my claim, I mean, if I’m right about this, then my point would be that Catholic lineages would actually do less well if everybody reproduced. That there is an advantage to having individuals who have stepped out of the reproductive market and therefore become capable of speaking on behalf of the lineage.
That somebody who is outside, I mean, think about a priest can’t make a ton of money, right? And they can’t reproduce, right? At least not out in public. And so the point is, that takes them out of two modes through which they might be corrupted. Somebody who can’t be corrupted because they’re not in a position, even if they were to accumulate money, they couldn’t spend it without calling attention to themselves. And they’re not in a position to be sexually corrupted, at least not out in public. And so those two mechanisms just so happen to put them in a position to speak for the lineage.
Dennis: I don’t know what he means here by speak for the lineage. I think what he would really need to do is refute the notion that memes evolve and are more important in this case than genes. That latter part is particularly important, not so much the former. He just hasn’t done that yet. It seems to me that he keeps assuming that that’s just the case. And I’m going to get into later why I think he does that, why that idea managed to spread through his mind. But for now, it seems like he’s just proposing that that’s the case, or assuming that that’s the case, but he hasn’t really refuted the rival theories.
Richard Dawkins: So what are we disagreeing about?
Bret Weinstein: I don’t know, maybe nothing. But if that is the case, so, all right, you say what are we disagreeing about? Is Catholicism a mind virus?
Richard Dawkins: Well, it’s a complex of mind viruses, yes.
Bret Weinstein: That’s what we’re disagreeing about. Okay, my claim is that Catholicism is a complex of adaptations, that they are lineage-level adaptations, and that they are, in large measure, responsible for the success of lineages that hold this set of beliefs, having spread around the globe and having been so successful, efficient at creating adaptations of all types... sort of argument.
Dennis: There was another cut in the recording there. But I just want to point out again that Bret is simply proposing that it’s the Catholic memeplex gives the people, that gives the genes of the people that have adopted the Catholic memeplex an edge over people that don’t, or that haven’t adopted that memeplex. But he doesn’t explain why. Like, why would being Catholic give you an edge genetically over someone who isn’t Catholic? That doesn’t make sense to me.
Richard Dawkins: Let me attempt to place my worldview in a few sentences, please. Darwinian natural selection is all about the differential survival of replicators. There are various kinds of replicators, of which genes are some and memes are other. And they are all engaged in a kind of tussle with each other to survive as replicators, using vehicles which are bodies, and which are brains, and which are all sorts of other artifacts and things like that.
Our separate genes, although we unite them together under the one word genome, are actually, I regard them as similar to viruses in that they are changing their partners in every generation, and you can regard the whole genome as a massive collection of viruses, massive collection of independently tussling replicators who survive better because they go around together as a gang. They survive better in the company of other such replicators, and that’s why we call them genes rather than viruses. There are others which survive better not going around in gangs but going around by being sneezed into the atmosphere or whatever it is, by spreading around by other means.
The only difference, the fundamental difference between those replicators which we call genes and those which we call viruses are that the method of transmission to the future of the ones that we call genes are through our sperms or our eggs, and therefore they have an interest in common to preserve the body in which they share, because that’s the only way they’re going to get into the next generation. That minority of them which are not destined to get into the next generation, get into the future via sperms or eggs, but by being sneezed into the air or defecated into the sewage system or left as blood lying around or something like that, we call them viruses. And the only difference is that their hope of getting into the future is not to cooperate with others in getting into an egg or a sperm, but getting out of the body in a different way, by being sneezed.
Now, memes are more of the latter category. They don’t go through sperms or eggs. They do, however, to quite a large extent, go down through generations longitudinally. So though it’s not sperms or eggs, they do go from parent to child. But we live in a great soup of replicators which are floating around. Some of them are memes, some of them are genes, some of them are cooperative genes which goes through the generations through sperms and eggs. Some of them are cooperative memes that go through the generations in the form of parents indoctrinating children or schools indoctrinating children. But everything we see around us is a soup of replicators and their phenotypic tools of replication, among which are extended phenotypic tools of replication. And that’s my piece said.
Bret Weinstein: Okay.
Dennis: I think Dawkins’ explanation of genes and viruses and how they’re different is absolutely brilliant. I really recommend reading The Selfish Gene if you want to learn more about that.
Bret Weinstein: So I, of course, agree with most of what you said. I, in my own mind, think of genes at the moment that the zygote is created. They may be very uneasy with each other up to that moment, but at the moment they are fused into a zygote, that single cell that then becomes a 30 trillion cell human, let’s say, they fall in love because, as you say, they have no mechanism for reproducing other than creating such an effective, coordinated creature that it is capable of reaching a moment of reproduction. And so it is that being trapped with shared fate that causes them to behave as an organism that is united in its purpose. So I think we agree on that.
In order to explain my perspective and where I think we differ, I need to borrow a concept from you, and I think you have described it as your most important contribution, and you just invoked it, the extended phenotype. Do you want to explain what that means in brief form? Can you do it?
Richard Dawkins: How long have I got? I mean, I can do it pretty briefly. Well, the normal word phenotype applies to bodies. The gene sits inside its body and influences the phenotype by means of embryonic processes. So wings and noses and toenails and hairs and things are all phenotypes.
Dennis: As are organisms’ behaviors, like I said earlier, like wolves hunting, stuff like that. That’s also part of the phenotype, except in humans, whose behavior is determined, if at all, only very little by genes. So human behavior is not really part of the genetic phenotype.
Richard Dawkins: Extended phenotypes are outside the body, and they include things like beaver dams and termite mounds and birds’ nests. They’re not part of the body, but they are every bit as much to be regarded as phenotypes, adaptations by genes for the propagation of genes. So although the genes don’t actually live inside the nest, don’t actually live inside the caddis fly house or the beaver dam, nevertheless these artifacts are all phenotypic devices for the preservation and propagation of the genes that created them.
You generalize that then to parasites influencing hosts for their own benefit. Parasites that cause their intermediate host to be more likely to be eaten by their final host and therefore passed on to the next part of the parasite cycle. The genes of the parasite are exerting phenotypic effects on the host, so that parasite genes have extended phenotypic effects on host bodies.
Extend that further and you have things like cuckoos who manipulate their foster parents into feeding them. The genes that make the baby cuckoo effective at manipulating and persuading the foster parent to feed it are exerting extended phenotypic effects on the behavior of the parent. Generalize it further, and when a bird sings, when a nightingale sings and influences the hormonal state of a female nightingale, when a canary sings and so on, then the effect on the female body of the male song is extended phenotypic effect of genes in the singing male. And that’s the story of extended phenotype.
Bret Weinstein: So, let’s take your example of a beaver pond, just to make this crystal clear. So, a beaver is a rodent that creates a dam by cutting down trees and blocking the waterway. That dam is necessary to its ecology. It uses the water to preserve wood that it can eat over the winter.
And your point in the extended phenotype, which I think is brilliant, is that the pond is every bit as much a part of this story as the molecules inside the beaver. That the genes inside the beaver create a system of physiology that is the beaver’s cells, but it also creates the pond, which is part of the beaver’s ecology, and it is artificial to divide the pond from the beaver, that it is the extended phenotype of the beaver that is in the pond. I agree with this. My point would be memes are extended phenotype.
Dennis: All right, so Weinstein is arguing here that memes are part of humans’ extended phenotype. And that can’t be right. And the reason that can’t be right is that the content of these memes could not possibly be genetically informed, for example, or determined. For example, the content of the memeplex of the English language, there are no genes that code for the English language. This is stuff that people have to learn from, they have to learn it afresh. They’re not born with any of that knowledge.
So, and this is true, I would imagine, for all memes, maybe there are some exceptions. And it’s even true in the animal kingdom. There are memes in the animal kingdom that are not inborn. And David Deutsch writes about some of this in The Beginning of Infinity. And I also, if I recall correctly, though I may be wrong about this specific example, but if I recall correctly, the behavior that cats have in the litter box is memetic. So cats will, after they’re done using the litter box, they will kind of try to bury the feces, and this, apparently, if I remember correctly, they do by copying behavior from one of the parents, I guess the mother or something.
Now it may, this specific example may be wrong, but things like that happen in nature. And these things, as far as we know, are not genetically given, because if the kitten grows up without a mother, say, it will never perform these actions in the litter box. Again, it might not be that specific example, but stuff like that happens in nature, in the animal kingdom. So even in the animal kingdom, where memes are not spread creatively, they’re spread by literal imitation, the mechanisms that determine how to imitate are given, but the meme of, say, using the litter box in a certain way is not genetically given. So even in the animal kingdom, these memes couldn’t be part of the animal’s or of the genes’ extended phenotype.
Bret Weinstein: And that the claim that memes are competing in their own meme sphere is a little bit like saying that ponds reproduce themselves using beavers. Which, you can definitely make that argument, but it’s not the most parsimonious explanation for beaver ponds. Beaver ponds are created by beavers to facilitate their own ecology, and they are passed down to next generation beavers, right? This piece of ecology is handed down sometimes over the course of decades or even a hundred years. These ponds, alterations of the landscape, are handed down as an inheritance to future generations of beavers.
And that to me looks very much like a lineage handing down a belief system that results in it being ecologically effective at doing things like holding a piece of territory, excluding others from it, taking over new territory by dispersing. And so memes are extended phenotype. My way of thinking is they should not be analyzed on their own. They should be analyzed as serving the interests of the underlying genome, the same way ponds are serving the interests of the underlying beaver genome.
Dennis: So it seems to me that Bret here invoked beaver dam, or beaver ponds using beavers to reproduce themselves, that he’s invoking that as something that’s sort of meant to sound ridiculous. He grants that you could use that as an explanation of why there are beaver ponds, but then he says that it wouldn’t be parsimonious, so he rejects the explanation for the wrong reason, but he correctly rejects it. It’s good that he rejects it.
Now, the problem is that just because beaver ponds are part of the extended phenotype of the beaver genes, that does not mean that memes are part of the extended phenotype of people, or even animals. I don’t think he’s explained yet, unless I’m missing something, why that should be the case. But anyway, Dawkins’ reaction here is gold now.
Richard Dawkins: I’m familiar with the fallacy. That is absolutely wrong. There is a succession that goes beaver, gene, pond, beaver, gene, pond, and so on, and superficially you could say that either one could be regarded as the phenotype of the other replicator. But the key point is that ponds don’t mutate and therefore are more likely to survive than not. Genes do. And that’s the fundamental fallacy in this argument. I call it Bateson’s fallacy, who said that birds are just a nest’s way of making another nest.
You’ve got to look at the replicator is the one which mutates and as a consequence produces more copies of itself which survive. That’s what genes do, that’s what memes do, but that’s not what ponds do, it’s not what beavers do, it’s not what nests do.
Dennis: Now, as much as I liked Dawkins’ response here, it seems to me that he took the device that Bret suggested as ridiculous seriously. I don’t think Bret actually meant that ponds use beavers to reproduce themselves. I think he’s just saying that thinking of memes as not being part of the extended phenotype of humans is a little bit like saying that beaver ponds use beavers to reproduce themselves. So I think Dawkins hasn’t criticized that point yet.
But what follows now is Weinstein actually defending the point that maybe a beaver pond is a replicator. So maybe he mistook Dawkins’ critique as a critique of his point that memes are part of the extended phenotype of humans. I’m not sure. Or maybe he’s just throwing it out there as a sort of orthogonal point. But yeah, let’s listen in.
Bret Weinstein: Well, I mean, I must say that when you turn this back on me and you say that ponds do not mutate, I’m just tempted to, to take up that challenge, because I think they do. And I don’t think that this is a good way to understand them. This is my point, is that we can treat them that way.
Dennis: Okay, he just said that it’s not a good way to understand them, to think about them this way. So I, I think he’s still on track. He’s just engaging, he’s just entertaining the point.
Bret Weinstein: I think beaver ponds actually do empty when a dam breaks.
Richard Dawkins: But then they don’t give rise to daughter empty ponds.
Bret Weinstein: Well, but the point is a beaver who builds a pond that empties is much more likely to suffer starvation during the winter.
Richard Dawkins: Precisely, and it’s the beaver that does the building.
Bret Weinstein: You’re making my point.
Richard Dawkins: The beaver gene that makes it.
Bret Weinstein: This is exactly my point, that the way to understand something like Catholicism is not a thing unto itself. It is a program that runs on the computer inside the head of a Catholic.
Dennis: So two things Weinstein gets right here that I want to point out is, first, the brain is a computer. That is correct. And second, that memes are programs. That is also correct. This is actually very good that he gets those things right. But in no way has what he said so far imply that just because the meme is a program on the computer that is the brain, that that somehow means that the genes have influence over that program. I think Weinstein is just completely discounting people’s creativity.
The way that they recreate that meme is by understanding it and recreating it in their minds by observing the behavior of other people. They want to explain the behavior of other people, and that’s how they recreate the meme. If you want to learn more about that, I suggest you read David Deutsch’s chapter on, it was either 15 or 16, I think, either on culture or on meme evolution, or maybe that’s the same one.
So again, none of that knowledge is inborn. The creative program may be inborn. I think it is inborn, but none of the memes are inborn, and the genes don’t have any control over what memes you acquire, kind of in scare quotes, because you’re not a passive recipient. You have to actively recreate those memes. And again, nothing that Bret Weinstein has said so far explains why genes should have any influence over memes. And so I’m still waiting for that explanation at this point.
Now, what’s, what Dawkins is going to respond to, he’s still taking Bret’s point, that it would be ridiculous to consider beaver ponds as using beavers to make, to reproduce themselves, he’s still taking that seriously, and he’s going to try to refute that one more time. And Bret’s going to say, well, no, that, you know, that’s not my point. My point is that memes are the extended phenotype, or part of the extended phenotype of people.
Bret Weinstein: And so the way to properly understand it, the way to get the maximum power, is to understand it as extended phenotype of the creatures in whom the program is running. Just as the way to understand beaver ponds is to understand them as extended phenotype of the beaver. They are a means to an end employed by beavers to preserve food over the winter.
Dennis: So Weinstein’s argument at this point seems to be a sort of analogy between the memes that are programs running on brains and beaver dams being part of the extended phenotype of beavers, and therefore somehow memes are also part of the extended type, of extended phenotype of humans. I don’t see that analogy working at all. I think he’s making several logical jumps there. It doesn’t work out that way.
Richard Dawkins: Among other things, I can only quote W.B. Yeats, you are still wrecked among heathen dreams.
Bret Weinstein: Wait. I don’t think I speak English well enough to understand what you just accused me of.
Dennis: I’m going to give Bret points for admitting ignorance here. I’d rather Dawkins hadn’t said that, because this is another one of those things, although he’s better at this than Bret, I think, overall in this conversation, it’s another one of those things that most of the audience won’t understand and won’t dare to admit that they don’t understand it. But Bret actually admitted that he doesn’t understand it, so I think that’s good.
Richard Dawkins: The fundamental logic of natural selection is that there are replicators which mutate and which produce copies which may or may not survive because they’re good at surviving. The way they’re good at surviving is by building phenotypes. Genes mutate, ponds don’t. That is absolute...
When you say ponds mutate, you didn’t really mean that. What you meant was that ponds change. Of course they do. They drain. They burst their dam. But that doesn’t replicate. That doesn’t give rise to a new generation of defective ponds. What does give rise to a new generation of defective ponds is a mutant gene in a beaver who builds a bad dam.
Bret Weinstein: We don’t disagree about that.
Richard Dawkins: We don’t, indeed.
Bret Weinstein: We agree about the beaver example. And what we don’t agree is how to map it onto the example of people and belief systems that exist over a long period of time. That’s the question. We agree that it is an inferior understanding of beaver ponds to imagine that they mutate and either do or don’t pass themselves down based on the quality of the information encoded there or whatever.
Dennis: It’s good that Bret clarified this. I think they’re back on the same page again, I’m guessing. It was good to clarify that this was just a device that he used. He didn’t say this specifically, but that that’s not the disagreement. The disagreement is about whether or not memes are part of the human phenotype.
Bret Weinstein: So the question is, what is the best way to understand somebody who says something perfectly at odds with what we can discover in a science lab, but that in saying this thing, they are highly successful at recovering resources from their local ecology and spreading into new habitats and taking over territory, excluding others, all of these things? And my point is simply that is the extended phenotype of the creature that is engaged in this behavior. And to the extent that it persists over evolutionary time, what it’s telling us is that in spite of the fact that those beliefs are not literal, that they are effective.
Richard Dawkins: I think you can make a case that ideas, for example, you’re now talking about religious ideas. Religious ideas spread because they’re spreadable. It’s tautological, just like natural selection. And the reason they’re spreadable is that they appeal to people. They appeal to people’s psychology, etc. That’s why they spread. You are trying to say, what are you trying to say? Extended phenotype? That the, a meme is an extended phenotype? No, a meme is a replicator. It is a replicator.
Bret Weinstein: And I’m not arguing that absent any other system that there wouldn’t be a trivial competition between memes. In fact, we see a trivial competition between memes on the internet.
Richard Dawkins: I agree. It might be trivial. And I don’t think I ever wanted to make the case that there really is an important evolution resulting from the natural selection of memes. I think there might be. It was a hypothesis that there might be.
Dennis: I’m a bit confused by this. I wonder if Dawkins is carefully questioning the notion whether memes evolve, because I thought that that was his contribution, is that memes evolve, or whether he’s saying there could be cases where memes act as selective pressures on biological evolution. Maybe that’s what he’s saying here. I don’t know.
Richard Dawkins: I just wanted to say they do function as replicators. I think it is unhelpful to call them extended phenotypes. They’re not phenotypes.
Dennis: Yeah, I agree with Dawkins. It’s not only unhelpful, it’s wrong. There’s no good explanation. Weinstein hasn’t given a good explanation. He has some fuzzy argument by analogy that doesn’t work, I don’t think.
Bret Weinstein: Is it time? Okay. Well, let me make one more point, then you can make the final point and then we’ll close this down. The key question and the prediction of the model that I’m presenting is that memes should show no interest in passing themselves down when it is not in the interest of the creature on whose minds they are operating.
Dennis: So then how does he explain the memeplex of national socialism resulting in 50 million deaths? That meme was running on plenty of people’s computers, or brains, I should say, and many, many of them died. So why is that? Their genes were not able to propagate, and yet the memeplex of national socialism was able to spread quite well during that time.
Bret Weinstein: So, for example, we both agree that a language is a meme complex. And my point would be, if you move to another country that doesn’t speak your language, you will have trouble adopting the language of that country. But your children will not experience a tension between their ancestral language. They will actually very easily acquire the language of the new habitat. Why? Because their old language is not struggling to survive. They are struggling to survive. And the very best tool that they can have to survive in this new habitat is the language that allows them to interface with the people who are there.
Dennis: I don’t think the reason he gives is quite right. The reason children don’t start with an inborn language is because knowledge of language is not genetically given. And the reason children are so good at learning a new language is because they’re just phenomenally creative.
Bret Weinstein: So the question is, if you are right about the nature of memes and that the point of their stickiness is about their own propagation and is orthogonal to the propagation of the genomes of the creatures that have these cultural structures, then those things should fight like crazy to stick around even in circumstances where they have no value. In my model, those things will gladly disappear in favor of superior meme complexes when it, it is advantageous to do so in some local circumstances. So it actually predicts a different behavior.
Richard Dawkins: I don’t know whether differential meme survival really is an evolutionarily important effect or not.
Dennis: Okay. I think this clears up what I was wondering about earlier. Dawkins seems to be speaking about biological evolution whenever he uses the word evolution, at least most of the time, I guess, not meme evolution. So here he just said that he’s wondering. He’s not sure whether memes have any effect on biological evolution.
Richard Dawkins: All I’m saying is that what matters in natural selection is the differential survival of replicators. In the case of gene replicators, then we know about the phenotypes that may cause them to survive, and it’s very clear, we understand it pretty well. In the case of memes, we don’t know.
Dennis: I think we do know what the phenotype is in the case of memes. Maybe not for all memes, but say, for example, for memes related to technological innovation, let’s say the memeplex surrounding cars. Well, the phenotype of those memes involves the actual material cars. That’s why there’s so many of them. It involves the behavior of people when they drive cars, certain jobs that involve car manufacturing or car repair. I think all of this stuff would be considered part of the phenotype of memes, or the memeplex surrounding cars.
Richard Dawkins: And it may be that maybe the meme-level natural selection is only in its infancy, maybe the internet will see it developing further, but I don’t see any reason at all to regard, if there is a reason why some memes spread more than others, among those reasons is likely to be the predispositions provided by genes and genetic selection, but that’s not the only one. The memes exist in an ecology of their own, and they might very well spread whether or not the ecology in which they spread is, as you would put it, the prior favorable one of that provided by gene selection. It’s an important component, but not the only one.
Dennis: Okay, so the conversation ends shortly after that. This is the last point that they make. Unfortunately, I don’t think Dawkins really refuted Bret’s point here. So I want to try to summarize what Bret was saying, then I want to try to refute it.
I think what Bret was arguing was that if meme evolution really is separate from biological evolution, which is, which is Dawkins’ point, they’re separate, or at least largely separate, he argues, Bret argues, then memes should, quote, “fight like crazy to stick around even when they have no value”, end quote. And instead what we, what we observe, he argues, is one memeplex just disappearing in favor of another when it is, just, when it is advantageous to the organism, like when a child learns a new language and that language is not the language of the parents.
But that’s a bit like saying, just because you, say, throw a squirrel in the ocean and it drowns, that squirrel genes happily make way for fish genes or something like that. I mean, yes, some memes cannot spread to some minds, but that doesn’t mean that those memes are part of the extended phenotype of humans. There’s still some logical jump there, and I don’t know how, how Bret, bridges that gap. And also, memes do fight fiercely. Like I said, wars are fought by people because of ideas. So we might even be able to, on the question of what a memetic phenotype might look like, I think wars are another example of a memetic phenotype.
I did watch another video, an interview with Bret Weinstein that was done after this debate with Richard Dawkins. I’ll put the link to it in the description. It’s on a channel called, on a YouTube channel called Rebel Wisdom. And so the host interviews Bret Weinstein about the interview with Richard Dawkins. And so they go over it. And I just want to, I learned a bit more about Bret’s reasoning here, and so I just want to go over that briefly.
Basically what Weinstein says, and I realize I keep switching back and forth between calling him Bret and calling him Weinstein, but basically what Weinstein believes is that adopting biblical beliefs is beneficial to the genes of the holder of those beliefs, and he thinks that New Atheists are too tied up in evaluating the truth claims religions make instead of looking at their evolutionary benefits, like how they help the genes spread. So just my two cents here on this point, I would be careful calling those things benefits, because neither genes nor memes ever need to benefit their holders. We’re only talking about beneficial to the replicator’s ability to spread.
But in any case, what he then goes over in that interview is he, he basically thinks that Dawkins made an error when he introduced the concept of memes, because Dawkins, he says, pictured the meme pool as a, quote, “new primeval soup”, end quote, thereby suggesting an independence of, quote, “memetic products and the genetic underpinnings of our physical nature”, end quote. And then a little later he says, quote, “if those two things are independent, then you could get things like religions that evolve to further their own interests at the expense of the creatures on whose minds they’re running. That would make sense given this argument”, end quote.
And I would say, yes, memes absolutely do that. Memes harm their holders all the time. I think religious memes do that. I think national socialism was a memeplex that did that. Communism is a memeplex that did that. There are plenty of bad ideas that managed to spread despite being bad. Maybe, maybe because they appeal to some other ideas that are, that have already spread, they, they’re compatible with them, or they take advantage of some errors in our thinking or whatever it might be, certain widespread errors, maybe.
So yeah, genes don’t need to be beneficial to their organisms, and I think Weinstein agrees with that, and memes also don’t need to be beneficial to their holders, and it seems like Weinstein does not agree with that. But I don’t understand why. If he truly understands the logic behind replication and behind how replicators behave and what they do, he should see that this works for both the gene and the, and the meme. But it seems that Bret doesn’t necessarily emphasize that, at least. Maybe he understands it, but he doesn’t emphasize it.
And he also just doesn’t believe that memes are separate from genes, like Dawkins thinks. He says, quote, “cultural traits are obligated to serve genetic interests”, end quote. Now, he doesn’t go into it in this interview, but I remember vaguely, maybe not so vaguely, I remember from some other interview that he gave that I can’t find now, where he said that the gene is in a great position to override memes because memes are downstream from genes. Like, something along the lines of, well, the genes build the brains that memes inhabit. And so therefore, the gene is in a position to exert control over memes.
So within that line of reasoning, it makes sense to me why Weinstein thinks that memes must be, beneficial to the gene’s ability to spread. Now it makes sense. He never said this in the interview with Dawkins and the debate with Dawkins, or in the interview that I referenced, only in that other interview. And so maybe that’s why Dawkins and, and Weinstein were kind of talking past each other. And I don’t think either one of them changed their mind at the end.
But I think this is the key mistake that Weinstein is making. It’s reductionism. Thinking that causality can only go from the substrate to the higher level and not vice versa. So he thinks that because, like I said, because genes build the brains that memes inhabit, that therefore genes can influence or exert control over those memes. But that is completely false. I mean, I could grant that genes, that there may be some genetic dispositions that, let’s say, in some minds or in some brains make it easier for some memes to spread to those brains than to other brains or whatever, maybe, but that’s not the point. These things happen on completely different levels of emergence. They’re not at all the same.
So this reductionism, I think, is the main mistake, like I said. And second, he’s presupposing, basically, that genes have control over people’s thoughts, but they don’t. People are creative. Like, again, how would Weinstein explain the examples that David Deutsch has given of people acting clearly against their genetic interests, such as fasting or jumping out of airplanes? If people can do that, how can genes have any influence, or any hard influence, over our thoughts? That doesn’t make a ton of sense. And if they can’t have the required amount of influence over our thoughts, then they also can’t have the required amount of influence that Weinstein alleges over memes.
And further, like I said earlier, within the neo-Darwinian theory of the mind, we can easily explain how it is that genes do not have great influence over the mind, because they only code for some inborn self-replicating idea. And then that self-replicating idea, as it starts to replicate, it creates a pool of evolving ideas. And because replication isn’t perfect, eventually mistakes occur, that pool over time will look very different. And so that’s how you get new ideas that aren’t inborn. Those are created during the human’s lifetime, not during his embryonic development.
Weinstein says that this alleged error of Dawkins, that memes evolve separately from genes, Weinstein argues that that is why evolutionary theory has been stuck since the 70s. But it’s not an error. So assuming that that is why evolutionary theory is stuck, if it is, I’m not sure it is, this isn’t why. There must be another reason, if it’s even true.
And so, unfortunately, it seems that Weinstein has this very cynical image of human beings, because he thinks, quote, “we are culturally programmed for something that cannot be defended”, and that, quote, “will lead to our extinction”, end quote. But he does think that our conscious minds can override that. But this is in conflict with the idea that he seems to hold that we’re just robots executing our genes’ wishes. So I’m a bit confused there. But he then suggests that to combat our genetic wiring, we should create a world in which, quote, “people’s needs are met”, end quote, and in which they are, quote, “free to engage in the production of meaning”, end quote, and that it is our obligation to create such a world.
This all sounds oddly Marxist and utopian and therefore dangerous. He does point out that utopian ideas are bad, but that doesn’t change the fact that this idea is bad. Whenever you hear somebody talking about what our obligation is, just run away. They’re trying to tell you what to do. That’s never a good idea.
But in any case, Weinstein paints this picture of people being these clueless monsters who have to overcome their inner demons. They’re born with this original sin. I don’t even know exactly what it is. Perhaps it’s this widespread idea that because our genes are selfish, that somehow that selfishness rubbed off on us humans. It’s a completely different kind of selfishness. That doesn’t make sense. That’s comparing apples and oranges. When we say replicators are selfish, all that means is they don’t care about anything because they’re not conscious beings. All they do is they want to spread right now. They don’t look ahead. They don’t look into the past. All they want to do is spread right this second. That’s what we mean by they’re selfish. When we say people are selfish, that means something entirely different.
But whatever the case, this view of people is very cynical indeed, and it’s false, and if taken seriously, it could be used to justify very bad things and atrocities committed against people, the very atrocities Bret thinks our genes are responsible for. So I would be careful with Weinstein’s ideas. I much more enjoy Dawkins’ part of the debate. I think Dawkins also isn’t free of mistakes. I think he still grants too much influence our genes have on our minds, much less so than Weinstein, but I think genes have very, very little influence over our minds, following David Deutsch.
And I also want to point out that even Dawkins, unfortunately, isn’t completely free of reductionist mistakes. I remember there was an interview he gave with Joe Rogan, where Joe Rogan made a comment like, okay, that’s a reductionist view. And then Dawkins was like, well, there’s nothing wrong with reductionism. That’s not true. There’s plenty wrong with reductionism. Software engineers know this, by the way, because they just understand the distinction between hardware and software, for example. And they understand, even if they don’t put it this way, but they understand that software is an emergent property and that you don’t explain it in terms of the underlying hardware. Somehow this distinction, this clear distinction hasn’t made it into biology, say, or even meme evolution. Weinstein was actually a little bit better on that point, where he said memes are programs that run on people’s brains because those brains are computers.
If I remember correctly, Dawkins wrote in The Selfish Gene that we should expect people who have the same memes, or if a meme spreads from one person to another, then we should expect both brains to have similar structures in similar areas or something, like physically similar structures, or their neuronal structures would be similar, or there would be similar wiring or something like that. And I think that’s the same reductionist mistake. It’s trying to explain an emergent phenomenon like a meme, a software property, in terms of the underlying hardware. And that just breaks down. It doesn’t work that way.
But in any case, genes don’t need to help their organisms in order to spread. That’s an orthogonal property. If they help their organisms, that can happen sometimes, but that’s not their concern. It’s the same with ideas. Ideas spread from person to person sometimes because they’re good, sometimes because they’re not good, or sometimes it doesn’t have anything to do with whether or not they help people, with anything. Memes spread like any other replicator. Memes spread because they’re good at spreading, just like genes. Genes spread through the gene pool because they’re good at spreading. And it’s the same with ideas in a single mind.
If somebody thinks of suicide, if somebody seriously contemplates suicide, that is because the idea of committing suicide, like I said earlier, has managed to spread through this person’s mind. And it would be ridiculous to suggest that this idea is somehow helping this person. That idea managed to spread through his mind at his expense, really, and he might kill himself for it.
By the way, speaking of ideas that spread within minds, I would love to find a name for those, just like Richard Dawkins calls ideas that spread between minds memes. If anyone has any idea for what to call ideas that replicate within a mind, I’d be very happy to hear it.
In any case, I think Weinstein is himself a good display of the fact that for ideas to spread, they don’t need to be good or helpful or whatever. As far as I know, Weinstein gained fame and notoriety for his role in the Evergreen College scandal, which I think that, by the way, is a really interesting story, and I think his role there is important and good. But in any case, now he has a platform to spread his ideas. So there’s a reason he has a platform to spread his ideas. I know it’s going to sound rude. I don’t have anything against him personally, but I don’t think that it’s, his ideas managed to spread because they’re particularly good. His ideas managed to spread because he has a platform.
What Weinstein should do is he should write his theory down in clear and simple language that anyone, that anyone can understand, and then have others criticize it. It’s unclear to me, actually, I take it back. I think it’s pretty clear, listening to the conversation, especially toward the end, that neither of them will have changed their minds, it seems to me at least. Nor is there any way to talk to either one of them, so neither of them will listen to this episode either. So it’s, it’s, it’s not easy to point these errors out to them, and I think they will just continue. And because they have a platform, I think Dawkins mostly spreads really good ideas, but because Weinstein has a platform, he’s going to be able to keep spreading this idea, and there’s going to be little room for error correction, it seems to me, and that is unfortunate.
And in any case, I hope you enjoyed this commentary. I might do these more often. I did that once before with that episode on Sam Harris’s podcast with Judea Pearl, but this one was a little different because it actually featured the sound bites from the actual conversation. So I hope you enjoyed it, and I hope you learned something from it. I certainly had a lot of fun creating it. I’ll see you next time.
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Soif the ideas from the 70s are riddled with error you would still expect progress. TheSlefish Gene solved specific problems. As we know solving problems creates new problems. Perhaps Bret means that he doesn't think these subsequent problems have been given enough attention. So you can argue there hasn't been progress since and still think the central ideas put forth in the Selfish Gene are right.
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If you're wondering why the audio is cut it is because Travis Panburn didn't know what he was doing. He organised all these "dangerous ideas" talks with people like Sam Harris, Jordan Peterson, Weinsteins etc. He basically cheaped out on the recording equipment. There were even events that were cancelled and people were not refunded. Seems like a grifter to me. But yeah no intentional cut, just pure incompetence.
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I don;t understand why this is bonkers. You could say the same thing about the peacock feathers example. How do the genes know to code for longer feathers. THe mechanism in this reagrd is clearly much easier to parse comapred with Bret's German genes case. I'm not saying he is right but there could be a mechanism. Also antisemitism, or The Pattern as David Duetsch refers to it, has been around for as long as we know so it could have had ample time to evolve potentially. I am however more inclined togo with the memetic bad ideas explanation.
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Also the inborn fear of heights isn't as easy to overcome as you may think. It's possible to be sure but it's no easy task.
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Does the fact that it is "not easy" to change imply that genes are still operative. Or is it hard because true ideas are hard to come by?
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I'd guess ideas that have successfully spread through one's mind are harder to change than inborn ideas.
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We have good explanations suggesting that peacock tails are genetically determined and good explanations saying creatively conjectured ideas are not. The neo-Darwinian theory of the mind in particular explains how ideas mutate away from their inborn origins. If anyone can refute the neo-Darwinian theory of the mind, I'll change my mind on this issue. As to why it's bonkers, consider this question: were genes encoding national socialism dominant or recessive? Were half-German babies only a little bit national socialist? How come some Germans were not national socialist at all? How come Germans dropped national socialism after the war so quickly if national socialism is coded for (or at least favored) genetically? Etc. Lots of problems with this view.
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BTW genes know how to code for feathers because they contain the instructions that make the feathers. I don't know what you mean by longer feathers in particular.
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Thanks for your replies.You corrected some of my errors. I should probably have waited until your closing statements to post my questions since you answered some of them there.
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My guess would be that the genes aren't coding for national socialism per se but some other things that when combined lead to national socialism. As I say I am more on board with the ideas and neo-Darwinian theory of mind as an explanation. Just trying to find the most charitable intepretation of what Bret is thinking. Although he should be stating it more precisely and clearly in the first place.
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