My blog about philosophy, coding, and anything else that interests me.
19 – Viral Philosophy
Artificial Creativity
Important: Read medical disclaimer at the bottom before listening
Today I’m speaking with Nick Hudson. He is the co-founder of the South African organization PANDA—Pandemics Data and Analytics—which, as stated on their website, “provide[s] decision makers calculated data on the virus’ cost on SA livelihoods.” Nick and I cover what is known about the virus and the disastrous effects of lockdown policies on people and businesses. We explore how bad epistemology and political philosophy lead to tangible harm in society, and how we should treat each other during this pandemic instead. I learned a lot—some questions that seem basic, such as whether masks work or not, have deep and interesting answers that may surprise you. Enjoy.
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Nick's Twitter: https://twitter.com/NickHudsonCT
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IMPORTANT: Medical disclaimer — Read before listening
Neither Nick Hudson nor Dennis Hackethal are trained medical professionals. The contents of this episode are for informational purposes only and do not provide a substitute for professional medical advice in any way, shape or form. Do not use information presented in this episode to make decisions about your or others' health. Speak with your doctor/medical professional instead. Reliance on any information in this episode is solely at your own risk.
Transcript
This transcript was generated automatically and may contain mistakes.
Dennis: Today, I’m speaking with Nick Hudson. He’s the co-founder of the South African organization PANDA—Pandemics Data and Analytics—which, as stated on their website, provides decision-makers calculated data on the virus’s cost on South African livelihoods. Nick and I cover what is known about the virus and the disastrous effects of lockdown policies on people and businesses. We explore how bad epistemology and political philosophy lead to tangible harm in society, and how we should treat each other during this pandemic instead. I learned a lot. Some questions that seem basic, such as whether masks work or not, have deep and interesting answers that may surprise you. Enjoy.
All right, I’m here with Nick Hudson. It’s great to have you on the show, Nick.
Nick: Pleasure, Dennis. Glad to be here.
Dennis: I’m curious, 2020 rolls around and January rolls around and February and we’re starting to hear about the virus. Then March, what was it? How were those early months of 2020? What were those like for you and what happened?
Nick: Well, with coronavirus being a seasonal story, we were sitting in the southern hemisphere, watching the northern hemisphere and getting a sign of what was to come. And a growing sense that something was going badly, badly wrong, and it wasn’t the virus.
Dennis: Right. What was it?
Nick: The reaction, the volume of it, the very quick repudiation of prior science, prior concepts of how to deal with infectious diseases, the ubiquitous nature of the coverage, the drama, all of that seemed to be pointing towards an immense overreaction. And that seemed to be borne out when we looked at the early data as it was emerging, which, as none other than Anthony Fauci pointed out in March, spelt out a picture of a fairly mild virus, one which would have mortality consistent with a serious flu season.
As the World Health Organization pointed out at the time in the naming documents for the virus, it would be seasonal, it would be closely related to other viruses that we have long lived with. And all of those things were swept under the rug and ignored. And even as the, as the volume of the reaction picked up, it was a very strange set of circumstances, very eerie.
Dennis: And so how quickly do you think the narrative changed around the virus?
Nick: I think it was extraordinarily fast. And for me, the tipping point was the Italian, the Northern Italy situation and that, you know, permanent coverage of what was essentially a handful of overwhelmed hospitals that, with the benefit of hindsight, are probably overwhelmed every two years, when that became the object of interest for every television camera in the universe. I think that was the tipping point. I can’t remember the precise dates.
Dennis: Okay. Was Italy the first country to lock down? Do I remember that correctly?
Nick: Second.
Dennis: China. Of course.
Nick: They invented it. And Italy was the first, yeah, after China.
Dennis: Got it. So, yeah, based on how the narrative has changed, what, what do we know about the virus today? And I don’t mean what is the current narrative, but what do we actually know? What are our best explanations about the virus in terms of its nature, how it spreads and so forth?
Nick: Well, for starters, it’s, it’s neither new nor deadly. So, but this has been known since February, that it’s not new. It is obviously a new taxonomic unit, but it’s new at the level of what is known in taxonomy as the individuum. In the same way that you and I are both members of the same subspecies, Homo sapiens sapiens, SARS-CoV-2 is a member of the same subspecies as SARS-CoV-1 and differs at the level of an individual, which is to say at the same level that Dennis and Nick differ. So to call that new is rather to try and persuade me that Dennis and Nick are indeed different species. Maybe we’ll leave it to the viewers to decide whether that isn’t the case by the end of the call.
But yeah, so that was the first, that’s the most important thing that we know that is contradicted by the narrative. The other, that it’s not deadly, was visible from the time of the Diamond Princess in our view. The dramatic story of the boat was overshadowing the data that emerged in two papers in March, which made it very clear that this virus did not have the kind of mortality rates that the World Health Organization had been talking about.
And there, I think what went wrong was that Tedros in his famous 3 March press conference conflated the case fatality rate that had been observed, I think in China, of 3.4% with the infection fatality rate of the flu, which is about 0.1%, thereby making out that this virus was 34 times as deadly as the flu. And that was a deep act of misinformation. It’s never correct to compare a case fatality rate with an infection fatality rate.
And as it turns out, and as the World Health Organization is now acknowledged by publishing the paper of Ioannidis of Stanford University, the infection fatality rate of the coronavirus is about 0.27%. And even that may be, well, even that is a gross overestimate for developing nations, which have much younger populations. Because another thing that we know is that the age-based infection fatality rate from this disease is massively graduated, with older people being at risk to the tune of about 1,000 times as much risk as younger people face, which is not to say that it’s a death sentence for the old people. That’s far from the truth. It’s just that the risk for young and healthy people is absolutely negligible.
Dennis: Right.
Nick: So I would say those are the big headline items. But we’ve also confirmed the seasonality. Anybody denying that right now is misrepresenting things. And in this regard, it’s consistent with the other coronaviruses that circulate endemically amongst the human population. I think there are four that are quite common. They’re all, like other respiratory viruses, a seasonal matter. The science of this is very contentious in terms of what exactly drives that seasonal behavior of respiratory viruses. There are several competing theses and they may all be true and contributory or they may not be true at all. But it is very much seasonal. That’s clear now.
And then, you know, another thing which I think was really important was we, we proposed early on that this, that the susceptible portion of the population was low. And I think that’s been, that was obviously the case from the Diamond Princess information and also from the, the, the rapid attenuation of the exponentiation of the epidemic curves, which was even visible in Sweden, which didn’t lock down.
And I think that that low susceptibility is related to the point I made earlier about whether or not this is a new virus. Because it’s not a new virus, and because closely related viruses are very familiar to our immune systems, there’s a big portion of any human population that is not susceptible, and it seems possibly a higher proportion in certain regions than in others. So for example, it would not be misleading to say that there’s been no epidemic in most of the world, Southeast Asia and Oceania, and really sub-Saharan Africa, with the exception of South Africa, there hasn’t been an epidemic. It’s really at very low levels of death per million of population. So that pre-existing immunity, I think is the best phrase to use to describe it, is a feature of all populations, but it’s much more pronounced in some regions than in others.
Dennis: Got it. And when you say seasonality, does that mean in winter specifically, or could it be in any particular season?
Nick: It’s in winter in the extreme latitudes. The story around the equator is more complicated, and it seems to be tied up, for example, in India with the monsoon season. There’s something entirely different going on with the Sun Belt in the United States, although it’s very pronounced and very consistent. But, you know, there the surges are more in the summer months, and I’ve heard people propose that that’s because of the use of air conditioners, maybe. But it seems that the more tropical countries have a less, it’s, it’s, it’s not a winter story.
And of course a tropical country has two, a bimodal seasonal distribution. Being close to the equator and having the sun directly overhead twice a year means that they don’t really have this kind of single winter a year. And that’s probably something to do with why it’s less clear what happens in the temperate regions.
Dennis: Right on. Okay. Tropical regions. So you’re in South Africa. What was South Africa’s response, immediate response, when the virus came on the scene?
Nick: Well, even before the virus came on the scene, we’d had one death and they locked down and it was one of the most draconian lockdowns in the world. That lockdown continues to this day. We are in something like 225 days of lockdown in South Africa. It has been lightened as we’ve gone. But in our view, it’s been an enormous crime against humanity to invoke the lockdown in the first place, I would say, and to perpetuate it for so long in an emerging economy, a developing country with no social safety nets to speak of, very poorly developed in many regards.
This was a fatal policy blunder and has probably got something to do, first of all, with the fact that we have amongst the highest age-based coronavirus mortality in the world. And secondly, that our economy has suffered terribly. We’re looking at something in the region of a 10% contraction in GDP for the year.
And I think it’s important in that regard to take a step away from First World or developed nation shoes and to just bear in mind that in every developing economy, millions of people occupy a rung in society that is just one level above poverty. And so when you start stripping away percentage points out of the GDP, that has a real existential threat element to it.
And in fact, our first paper, the first paper published by PANDA, was aiming to address exactly that question, which we felt had been ignored in the narrative, namely that lockdown itself would have a mortality consequence. And when we went through the mechanics of producing that paper, we came to the conclusion that even under the most generous, even taking the most generous perspective towards lockdown and the most stingy perspective towards the economy, lockdown would kill at least 30 times as many as it would save, in looking at a years-of-lost-life perspective.
And the numbers would be, I believe, more moderate for developed countries, but it’s also our expectation that when the dust has settled and the analysis has been completed, it will turn out that lockdowns were a net negative effect from a mortality and morbidity perspective all over the world wherever they were attempted.
Dennis: So in South Africa, how does the lockdown manifest concretely every day? Are people under house arrest? What does it look like?
Nick: At the beginning, we were under house arrest with very modest allowances for physical exercise and shopping. If you take a look at Google mobility statistics for South Africa, you’ll see it had this incredibly profound and sudden attenuation of mobility. And the economy took an immediate and deep crash, and very quickly the nature of that economic crash became permanent to semi-permanent. In other words, there is ground lost that will never be recovered in the medium term.
We had an abundance of rules that were without any apparent rhyme or reason. So the government attempted to regulate behavior in quite microscopic detail. So, for example, you were allowed to buy cold chicken, but not hot chicken. And you were allowed to buy closed-toed shoes, but not open-toed shoes. And you were allowed to buy T-shirts, but only if they were intended for the purpose of being used as undergarments. So it was truly comical buffoonery that went on in the, in the stipulation of the regulations of our lockdown.
But I think it, to get too bogged down in the detail is to be silly. The, the fundamental distinction between essential and non-essential businesses is one that eludes me to this day. And that’s a bit of malarkey that has been indulged in by many countries.
Dennis: Right, right. So from what I’m hearing, I can hear a dissatisfaction with government policies. And I imagine that that was what motivated you to start PANDA pretty quickly, it seems.
Nick: Yes. You know, our lockdown, as with so many others, was promised to be a three-week lockdown to provide the hospital system with time to prepare and to flatten the curve, even though already by then we were very skeptical as to how enough retardation of the reproductive rate of the virus would occur to make a significant impact on the curve. If you look at these models, in order to produce an appreciable curve flattening, you have to make very elaborate assumptions, for example, that you’re going to halve the reproductive rate of the virus. And we just found that to be wholly implausible.
And it turns out we were correct, and the modelers in South Africa who have been brave enough to issue second variations of their drastically wrong models have reduced that assumption to 0.85, at which point the, the flattening effect more or less disappears.
But it was the same story, you know, time for the, time for the lock-, for the hospital system to prepare. And then after a couple of weeks, the announcement that the lockdown was going to be extended for a further two weeks, and then for a month, and then for another month and another month, until you get through to 225 days or whatever we’re on, you kind of lose count. And when that first extension came around, we jumped into action and said, this is, this is heading for disaster. And we published that first paper.
Immediately after that, we also started working on trying to understand what drove this massive difference from country to country in observed population fatality rates. And we built a very big generalized linear model taking into account all sorts of factors, attempting to look at all sorts of factors. We stated a hypothesis up front that we thought it would be dependent on the average age of the population, the prevalence of comorbidities, the prevalence of obesity, and the hygiene hypothesis, which is going back to that susceptibility and pre-existing immunity idea. The hygiene hypothesis is a conjecture that people who live in societies where the prevalence of disease is high, communicable diseases, benefit, if they survive, from enhanced immune response.
Dennis: Another way of putting that is all the susceptible people are already dead.
Nick: Yeah. And so we tested that pre-stated hypothesis, found that three of the four components stacked up. The fourth one didn’t. And then we began to throw other things into the model out of curiosity, just to see what else stacked up as, as a relevant variable, and we didn’t find much. I mean, we tested mobility, we tested, temperature, we tested, or any number of, items. And one of them that we tested was lockdown stringency, and it turned out that lockdown stringency had no correlation with ultimate mortality.
And we were even, even we, although we expected that the effect on reproduction rate would be small, we were kind of surprised by the result that there was no impact on duration to peak and no impact on overall death rate when we’d controlled for age, comorbidity and obesity. And that was quite a shocking result for us, and one which has actually been replicated now. And I think you’ll see, it’s already happening in the last couple of weeks, you’ll see papers coming out attempting to show that lockdowns work, and failing.
Dennis: Have you found, I’m curious, looking at any of the data, if some of them are negatively correlated with what they purport to, with what lockdowns purport to achieve? So in other words, they actually make things worse when it comes to the virus?
Nick: Well, at, you know, the time, at the time of our publication of that, that working paper, a lot of the data wasn’t in yet. So we were working on the countries that had early, epidemics, northern hemisphere predominantly, and, completing the curve using, you know, fairly rudimentary statistical methods for ones that were at a fairly advanced level.
At the time, when we saw that first result, that lockdown didn’t seem to have a beneficial effect, we wondered whether in the fullness of time it wouldn’t swing around to actually having a statistically negative effect. And we’re in the process of refreshing that paper, and that is indeed our finding, that lockdowns actually have a negative effect on coronavirus mortality, and it’s a statistically significant one.
I now am not as shocked by that result, because I’ve understood the epidemiological modeling associated with diseases that have very graduated mortality rates. And it’s, interesting, there are a number of academics who quite separately have pointed this out at various points in time. The earliest reference I saw to this was in 2011 in a paper by Marc Lipsitch, who’s an ardent member of Team Lockdown, very strangely.
But the idea is that if you have a group, let’s just simplify it and say you’ve got a vulnerable group and a non-vulnerable group, if the, if you reduce the mobility of, the, of the vulnerable group, oh, sorry, of the non-vulnerable group relative to the non-vulnerable group, you’re in effect shifting the, the disease burden onto the vulnerable group.
Dennis: Ah, I see. Okay.
Nick: And what that does is, you know, what you, what you want to do is, if you, you know, the end point is herd immunity, however you slice it. This idea that herd immunity is a strategy is completely wrong. It’s a dishonest move to make, to call it a strategy. And the endpoint in any epidemic situation is herd immunity, whether you get there by infection or by vaccine. And what you want is to reach that herd immunity point, maximizing the number of vulnerable people who are in the unexposed group.
Dennis: Right. So if you lock down the non-vulnerable people, you shift the burden onto them, you make it more likely that they end up in the exposed group.
Nick: So it’s a very simple logic, actually. It only sounds counterintuitive to people who have been banging the lockdown drum for many months. But if, like me, you are in a position of being, having been skeptical about the project from the word go, then it’s a very easy concept to grasp. And so it’s actually the expected result is that, I would say, you know, people who are expecting that lockdowns will be associated with reduced mortality are dreaming. It’s, the expected result is that they’re, that they will increase mortality, and you have to come up with a reason why that increase in mortality is justified.
I think it exists in the popular imagination. There’s an idea that slowing viral spread will save people, but that isn’t even a proposal of the models that put people into lockdown. You know, when they suggested that we should flatten the curve with lockdowns, they weren’t imagining that that reduction of the viral spread would per se save people. What they were trying to avoid was people being unable to access medical care. So it’s a second-order effect. In terms of the first-order effect, none of those models entertain a reduction in aggregate mortality as a result of lockdown from first-order effects.
Dennis: Got it. So there doesn’t seem to be any light at the end of the tunnel yet in South Africa when it comes to when the lockdown might be lifted?
Nick: Well, they’ve just extended it last night for another month. The restrictions are now pretty light.
Dennis: Okay.
Nick: I basically don’t feel that my personal life on a day-to-day basis is at all inhibited, other than in, with respect to, there’s still, restrictions on what you can and cannot do with, with, with regard to large gatherings, and restaurants are constrained, and inbound travel is constrained by this ridiculous idea of having to have a negative PCR test before you visit the country. I mean, in the context of a, you know, and I must explain, our epidemic is over. I mean, it’s gone down to levels that are just microscopic in relation to general background mortality.
We were in the, we were going into the, you know, the summer season now. And so there’s no expectation of any kind of, as they call them, second wave in the middle of summer. That would be ridiculous. Nonetheless, our ministerial advisory committee have been banging on the drum for months now that there will be a second wave now this summer if we don’t all wear masks and behave in various absurd ways. It’s been a disgraceful episode. Our agencies, left, right, and center, have completely failed the South African public and failed to push back against the political narrative.
Dennis: Speaking of masks, what is your opinion on them? Do they work?
Nick: Well, there’s no sign in the data that mask mandates have any beneficial effect. And what I always say to people is, it’s, if, if you’re listening to somebody who cannot list the pros and cons of masks and hold in their mind the idea that they might be hurtful or helpful, and that that is a matter of empirical analysis, then you’re speaking to somebody who does not deserve to be listened to. This religious mania around the masks is clearly wrong, and as is the, the sort of literal, negation of mask wearing. I’d, I would caution people up against both perspectives.
And I mean, the intuition is quite clear, right? You put a barrier between yourself, you’re, between your lungs and your, and the outside world, it’s going to catch some stuff. What does it catch? Well, it obviously can’t catch a virus. That’s way too small. So what’s it going to catch? It’s going to catch droplets. Now, that’s well and good. So droplets will be caught in the mask on the way out or on the way in. But there’s much more to the story than that. What happens to the droplet once it’s on the mask and there’s a rush of air on inhalation and exhalation? Does it nebulize the droplet? Does nebulization worsen the end nature of the infection? Does it make it more likely that the infection locates itself in the lungs instead of in the trachea?
Dennis: Just to be clear, nebulization is the spreading of the droplet into tinier droplets?
Nick: Yes.
Dennis: Okay.
Nick: Yes. So nebula, the Latin word for cloud, turning the droplet into an aerosol.
Dennis: Got it.
Nick: Very small particles. And our cilia and in our, you know, windpipes, catch, droplets very effectively, but aerosols less effectively. That’s why when you, take medication that’s intended to be topical in the lungs, you breathe a nebula through a nebulizer, something that bypasses the cilia. And, and so if, if a mask acts to nebulize droplets, then that would cause potentially an increase in the severity of infection.
And you also need to step back from the narrow lens of coronavirus and think about what the consequences are for having a barrier right in front of your face that captures other bacteria and funguses and could cause them to proliferate and cause other health impacts. And you’ve got to think of the physiological impacts of increased carbon dioxide and so on.
And then, then there’s also another way of looking at it, which is to say there are many masks in nature, filters of one sort or another, some, some pretty impressive and large ones, as in the baleen whales. But there are all sorts of filter feeders out there in nature filtering, you know, anything from large particles to very, very small ones, organisms, I should say, rather than particles. And so if a mask was so effective at preventing viral intake or improving the nature of viral uptake in some way, it’s rather strange that we haven’t evolved some kind of mask system, given that we have co-evolved with viruses like coronavirus and the influenza virus.
Or another way of putting it is maybe we have a very effective mask in the form of our cilia.
Dennis: Right.
Nick: And that interposing a little bit of cloth is not really going to help things. So as you can see, I err on the side of skepticism, but I would, you know, in the face of hard, randomized, controlled trials, I would change my perspective immediately. And the only ones that I’m aware of are the 11 trials that have been analysed in a meta-study regarding the 1918 Spanish flu epidemic, which came to the conclusion that masks were not of benefit. And then there’s the Danish mask study, which is being blocked for publication for the simple reason that it finds the wrong answer.
Dennis: All right.
Nick: I think there’s an allegation that the sample size is too small, but given the proclivity of academic journals for publishing non-randomized controlled studies where the sample size is entirely irrelevant, I find that difficult to swallow.
Dennis: Do you happen to know who’s blocking the publication in Denmark?
Nick: I was told who the two... It’s not in Denmark. It’s actually in the international scene. I don’t want to get the journal names wrong, but they were both highly regarded medical journals.
Dennis: I see. Yeah, I mean, even just... And speaking of masks, even just stepping away from the data for a minute, you know, going into this, it made sense to me, and I said this in another episode, it made sense to me intuitively, like you were saying earlier, that a mask, if you put something between your lungs and the outside world, that something would be prevented from spreading. But the explanation you gave that our lungs have evolved to deal with droplets, but not with nebulas, that is fascinating. That had not occurred to me.
Nick: Yeah.
Dennis: And I think that’s very important. I mean, because, yeah, I mean, people have been living in close proximity with each other for millennia, hundreds of thousands of years, millions of years, and our ancestors, too. So it would make sense that droplets would always have spread between people and people must have evolved defense mechanisms. Otherwise, we wouldn’t be here today. Now, of course—
Nick: Yes.
Dennis: Go ahead.
Nick: Sorry, I was going to say, for me, what this is, so many of the lessons of coronavirus are lessons in having respect for complexity. In the same way that I disregard scientists who come down emphatically on the, on either side of the mask question as being either dishonest or stupid, I am deeply skeptical of people who feel that they know the answers when it comes to manipulating complex systems, whether those systems are human bodies or economies or climates. Brave is the man who believes that he knows how to control one of those three beasts with whatever gizmo or idea he’s come up with. So that, that reservation about tinkering with complexity is a, is a very deep one for me.
And I have only really, in working at PANDA with the wonderful scientists that we have on our team, come to appreciate just how deep that complexity becomes when we delve into the human immune system. I mean, it’s a miraculous thing. And the same way I imagine that you would have an abiding respect for the human brain as possibly the most amazing object in the observable universe, the immune system gives it a good race, I’ll tell you that. It’s got an intelligence built in over billions of years of evolution, probably predating eukaryotic cells.
So for me, that’s been wonderful just from an intellectual perspective to delve into that. I can’t say that I have the deepest or most retentive memory in that regard, because it’s all been a rather crash course. But we’ve got some great immunologists and doctors in our team who do simplify it somewhat for the layman, which I consider myself to be in that department, and most, in fact.
But it really is, for me, one of those things: when it comes to masks, when it comes to changing human behavior, you’ve got to look out for those knock-on effects. Stress, for example, or vitamin D would be another one. I think the effect sizes here are up for grabs and open for debate. But there’s certainly something going on with all of these things, and striking fear into people instead of informing them of the real risks, locking them up in their houses. All of those things strike me as things that could potentially worsen the susceptibility and disease, the clinical course of the disease. So I have a great deal of conservatism when it comes to intervening with complex systems, including the human body.
Dennis: Right. Yeah, I think the Popperian epistemological approach is basically if you already have a complex system that contains a lot of knowledge, you don’t want to make any drastic sudden changes to it. Like, basically, revolution is almost always bad. You want to have small piecemeal changes over time. And yeah, I agree with that.
But now just to play devil’s advocate, when it comes to masks and when it comes to droplets versus nebulas, I know nothing about epidemiology or diseases or anything. But I would imagine that there have been diseases that have been fatal to large parts of the population in our history that were transmitted via droplets. Am I wrong about that?
Nick: Well, Spanish flu gave it a good run, and that was a respiratory virus transmitted in exactly the same way, one would assume, as a coronavirus, right? Although implicated, implicated in that whole story was a bacterial pneumonia following the viral pneumonia. That, that’s common. If you have a pneumonia, it often ends up in a bacterial pneumonia. But just bear in mind that the science around antibiotics was in its infancy at that point, right? So that would have been an example of something that killed a huge multiple on a population-adjusted basis relative to coronavirus.
And of course the plague, the bubonic plague, that’s not a droplet infection story. It’s a more complex story to do with rats and fleas. But certainly human proximity was part of the story there to complete the life cycle of that organism. But yeah, I mean, there have been diseases for which the human anatomy was not equipped to respond on a wide scale, and there was deep, deep depopulation as a result. But coronavirus is clearly not in that domain, not even close, not by probably two orders of magnitude.
Dennis: Right, right. It reminds me of conversations I’ve had on the topic with others who say, well, you know, imagine if the, speaking of lockdowns and the justification for them, imagine if the, if the mortality rate was way higher? Let’s say it was 80, 90%. Wouldn’t that justify lockdown? Well, first, let me ask you if you think that would justify lockdown. I can tell you my opinion after.
Nick: Yeah, my answer is no. I think a far better approach than to start instructing people as to how to behave in the face of risk and what trade-offs they should be making. And you can’t do that knowing the trade-offs, right? It’s an information problem. You don’t know what’s, it’s beyond the reach of man to know what trade-offs are appropriate for every individual in a society. And that becomes painfully obvious in South Africa, where basically people are forced to lock down, even though the outcome of that is almost certain starvation. But, and in the face of a disease which presents very little risk to them.
Dennis: Right.
Nick: So it’s quite, it’s quite galling. But I would say a far better route from an ethical perspective would be to inform as well as you can. And we could have spent a fraction of the money that it cost us to lock down to inform people reliably about the risk that they faced and how to do their best to rein in that risk. You can’t say that the actions would ever have been perfectly executed, but there would have been a far cry better than lockdown.
So I would say on an ethical basis, no, you should never do that. And, I think that the intuitive objection to that idea, you know, that, well, surely if it’s, if it’s so bad, then lockdown would be justified, actually, no, because when, when the bodies are on the streets and you’re having to step over them, I think people get the message and will take the right actions for themselves.
In the case of coronavirus, you know, in South Africa, you often meet people who don’t know anybody who’s died of coronavirus. And that’s not too surprising, given that there’ve been around 20,000 official deaths. The real number may well be lower, given the proclivity to include deaths with coronavirus rather than deaths from. But we, that’s out of a population of, you know, 60 million people. So, and, and in the context of, I think we have about half a million deaths a year, you know, in, from, in normal course. Right. So 20,000 out of, out of 500,000 is, is not, a massive story. I mean, we have 10 to 20,000 deaths from the flu every year.
Dennis: Yep. Yeah, no, I completely agree. And I was going to say the same thing. If mortality rates were so high, well, then it should be very easy to simply persuade people. And then there’s no need for force.
Nick: Yes.
Dennis: I mean, I think that’s what should have been, tell me if you agree or disagree, but I think that’s what should have been, I’m guessing you would agree with this, I think that’s what it should have been, the approach from the start. Governments seem to simply have taken on this role unsolicited. I don’t think anybody asked them to do this, at least not...
Nick: Well, I think the World Health Organization did.
Dennis: The World Health Organization asked governments, yeah.
Nick: And there was also propaganda from China. There’s no question of that. We saw it.
Dennis: Well, so I want to get into that. I want to get into that because I think it’s fascinating. What do you think of, I think Bret Weinstein, although I always confuse the two brothers. I don’t know if you’re familiar with them. I think it was Bret.
Nick: Yes, for sure. So Eric, Eric is the, the, the podcaster associated with Peter Thiel, and Bret is the guy from Evergreen State.
Dennis: That’s right. Okay, so I think it was Bret then who was on Joe Rogan’s podcast who, yeah, who presented the hypothesis that the virus might actually have been manufactured, that it was, that there’s some evidence, he says, that the virus can, you know, was engineered by humans, although maybe not for the purpose of infecting people, but just as a, you know, as a part of studies in the laboratory, but that the lab, but that the virus has got, had gotten out. What do you make of that?
Nick: I, I don’t have an opinion on it, and I’ve never asked the scientific team at PANDA to give me an opinion on it, for the simple matter that it doesn’t affect policy. And we are in this to try and replace the bad science of policy with good science. And so that’s a sunk cost, whatever the truth in that is. I mean, I’m not saying that it has no ramifications, but I simply don’t have an opinion on it.
Dennis: I mean, it was fascinating to see really what happened in Wuhan and the amount of force that was used. I had not seen on such a great scale. What is it do you think happened there? Was this, I mean, I’ve seen on Twitter, for example, Michael Senger, who I think you follow as well, or might be familiar with, has proposed that much of this was planned and China has been strategically planting the idea of lockdowns on social media to pressure people in other countries to implement them. What is your opinion of theories like that?
Nick: Well, I have spoken to Michael, and I think one of his ideas is it wasn’t, you know, that it wasn’t a sort of a Machiavellian long-term plan to, to, to bring about the situation, but rather when they were seen by leaked social media footage and so on to be doing some pretty horrible things, like welding people into their apartments and so on, that they went on a sort of a propaganda offensive, a public relations effort, to try and promote the virtues of what they were doing. And they were almost comically, you know, the kind of, the kind of footage that can only come out of a communist administration, you know, of ridiculous, imagery and video clips and so on, and clearly staged sound bites from children and one thing and another.
I mean, and, you know, we are asked to believe that when we know full well that nothing happens on social media without the blessing of the Communist Party. So you know that anything that comes to the outside world that’s favorable is propaganda.
Dennis: Sure.
Nick: By definition. And so they went on the, the theory is that they went on a public relations exercise that then ended up being very successful and, took a lot of people in. And, and again, it’s this appeal to intuition, you know: there’s a deadly virus around, okay, we, if you’re accepting that point, then how bad can it be to not get too close to people who might be infected? You know, so lockdown has a basic intuition. It’s just that it doesn’t hold up to scrutiny.
Dennis: I see. So if I understand correctly, it wasn’t like China had any bad intentions. They, they didn’t want to necessarily hurt people or hurt other countries. They just were, were worried about their image, locking their people down so drastically, that they wanted to spread propaganda or maybe get other countries to do it too, so that they’re, that they don’t look so bad.
Nick: Yes. I, I, I’m, I’m in that boat. I mean, I, I... But again, because it’s not relevant to policy, I don’t spend an inordinate amount of time thinking about it. But I’d be lying if I said to you that I spend no time on that one, because it’s just too fascinating.
I mean, for me, this was the really stunning thing. CDC, the World Health Organization, any number of epidemiological journals have over the decades consistently advised against quarantining of the healthy, which is the previous term by which lockdowns were known. And it is astonishing that the rule book was torn up in, in a matter of weeks. Unpicking why that happened, and what the role of social media was, what the role of perverse incentives was, what the role of a man like Tedros was. I mean, I don’t think he’s an insignificant actor in this whole story, who is coming from a...
Tedros, the secretary, sorry, Director-General of the World Health Organization, was, I think, minister of health under a particularly brutal communist regime in Ethiopia before he became Director-General of the World Health Organization. And he was promoted into that position, it is understood, largely by the offices of the Chinese Communist Party. The rival for that position at the time was a guy by the name of Dave Nabarro, who was the fellow who came out about six weeks ago, I think it was, saying that it was clear that lockdowns should not be continued and that it was a grave mistake for countries to see lockdowns as the primary method in their response.
And he is a senior envoy for the, senior advisor, might be getting my titles muddled up here, but he’s a senior advisor to the World Health Organization. So it was rather interesting to see him come out with that statement. But yeah, when in the race between Nabarro and Tedros, the Chinese got the upper hand and appointed a creature just like themselves into the position. So no surprise that, Tedros took a visit to China and, you know, hear no evil, see no evil, speak no evil, came back with glowing reports as the Chinese, yeah, reaction.
Dennis: Yeah. Well, so I know you said you don’t spend that much time thinking about it, but, for me as a layman, how much influence does China have over the World Health Organization? I always, again, knowing nothing about such organizations, I always pictured them as a primarily American-influenced organization. Am I wrong about that?
Nick: I don’t know about the detail of the politics. I would think that who you appoint to Director-General makes a huge difference.
Dennis: Sure. Okay.
Nick: There also may be something in the nature of a person who goes to work for these big supranationals. If you take a centralist approach, to the world, you are by implication denying that respect for complexity that the Popperian approach would, advocate for, right? And, so I would see those people as more likely to fall for a communist fallacy than, than your, the average person, and certainly more likely than average Popperian.
Dennis: Agreed. Yeah, I mean, this brings us to the epistemological dimension that I’d like to get into a little bit more. I mentioned earlier that, you know, if the mortality rate was higher, it’d be so much easier to persuade people. This is the dimension that I regret the most, that there seems to be no emphasis whatsoever in the public discourse, at least, or I shouldn’t say no emphasis whatsoever. I do see some people talking about it, but not nearly enough, of how do we persuade people? How do we advise? How do we just inform? It seems that people want to rule with an iron fist, and they seem to think if only everybody would agree, you know, this would be so much easier. Why doesn’t everybody just stay home?
But there are problems to be solved here, and you can only solve problems by creating knowledge. You can’t solve them by coercing people to do what you want them to do. But that is missing from the public discourse overall, is my impression. And what seems to have happened, this is what at least some of the people I follow on Twitter seem to regret as well, is that there’s more of a move to totalitarianism in that sense, even in the West, where it’s particularly worrying, I think, where decisions are made without regard for people’s consent.
Nick: Yeah. I, I, I’m, I very much share your concern there. I am totally alarmed by this, the, the readiness with which most people in most, almost all Western societies have embraced this totalitarianism. There’s been a profound preference for authoritarian modes of thinking over liberal ones. And that has been deeply disturbing for me. I’ve lost many friends in this process, people who I thought shared liberal fundamentals, who turn out not to, and who readily reached for the state, the big, the big daddy, when at the slightest provocation, the slightest fear. It’s been a failing, an enfeeblement, a general failing of mind and courage that I’ve witnessed on a widespread basis, and I’m battling to deal with.
It was not my perspective on people that they were like that before this happened. I, I think I was, generally a lot, a lot more generous and a lot more optimistic about the nature of man than, than I am now. I mean, don’t get me wrong, I, I still regard the human mind as the most beautiful thing, and I share the perspectives of, yourself and David with respect to the human mind being a universal computer, and what really matters is the program running on the brain, right? Sorry, I’ve been using the word mind where I should be saying brain. So, I, I share those perspectives, but it has been very alarming for me. We have some bad programs running on many brains, and, those programs have, resulted in the world being let down in a very bad way.
So yes, that’s one dimension of the epistemological problem, but there are others, that have intrigued me throughout this. The one has been how incredibly powerful the old 19th-century empiricist ideas are and how much, how much attraction they still have, how much sway they still exert. It’s, it’s been visible in the simple utterances of the World Health Organization time and time again. I’m not sure if you were aware that at one stage, came out with this amazing sentence, “There is no evidence, for human-to-human transmission,” right, right at the beginning of the process.
Which is astonishing on a number of levels, because, first of all, from our kind of Popperian perspective, that’s, not at all how you go about, generating your theories. You don’t wait for data and evidence to emerge before you create a explanation. And it, it was, what they were referring to, there was some kind of low-level evidence that, person A had transmitted to person B, you know, but there was plenty of evidence that coronaviruses in this, in fact, it’s not even necessary to use the term species, but in this whole order are commonly human-to-human transmitted. So a better way, a better, a better initial position to occupy would have been, “At this stage, there is no reason to believe that this is not human-to-human transmitted.” You know, and the, just the distinction in language was profound and set things on the wrong track.
Another similar one was, “There’s no evidence for asymptomatic cases,” which was a perspective that they held at one stage. And, you know, the idea was that this, that if there were asymptomatic cases out there, then maybe the Chinese hadn’t contained it with their lockdown, and they didn’t want that idea to get out there. So they denied—
Dennis: Interesting.
Nick: —there were cases that the Chinese had not detected, which all speaks to the political agenda here. So you had these very empiricist perspectives, data first, then data leading to explanation, rather than explanation being tested by data.
And that surfaced again in the form of these models, where I think there the failing was maybe slightly different from either of the two examples before, in that the generators of these causal models, causal structure models, failed to appreciate that their models were in themselves explanations that needed to be tested against real-world data. And so they would go and attempt to calibrate them, a data-driven approach, calibrate them off statistics that they felt would indicate how the causal ant trap, ant farm should be calibrated, right? And then publish and walk away, because, you know, they’d used the data to build the model. It wasn’t the role of the data to test the model.
And so when things started departing, and, and all the predictions of those models started failing left, right and center, they didn’t really even notice the extent to which that was true. So they would tend to interpret it in very, very naive terms, as like, well, I mean, we can be forgiven for getting the number of deaths wrong, rather than looking at and saying, well, structurally and in, in terms of our sort of causal structure, is there something that’s being challenged by the data? And it was indeed being challenged left, right and center, as I say.
So for example, this question of whether the R0 was actually being reduced by the interventions that were proposed as a result of the model structure, really. At some stage, those interventions had to be released. The models, if extended beyond the point of release, would have predicted a resurgence. And indeed, when Denmark and Germany lifted their lockdown, the cry went up, “But you’re going to kill everybody. It’s gonna, you’re going to be faced with a wall of death,” right? And when that wall of death failed to materialize, they didn’t say a word. There wasn’t a, “Oh, there must be something basic wrong with our model.” And there was the assumption of a universal susceptibility was the underlying assumption that was wrong.
Dennis: Right. Okay.
Nick: The reason there was no resurgence is the interventions had, had no effect. The epidemic had run its course, and, its seasonal course, and now when lockdowns were released, nothing was going to happen, because susceptible people were no longer there.
Dennis: I see. So clearly people aren’t looking to criticize their theories. They’re looking to support them. And so they’re, they’re not going to learn anything if anything doesn’t fit their—
Nick: Yes.
Dennis: —theories.
Nick: I think psychology, psychology is a very important component, but philosophy as well, epistemology as well. They were not operating from the mindset of working out all of the predictions that were entailed in their models and testing whether all of those predictions were being observed in nature.
Dennis: Right. Yeah, something that worries me about lockdown policy is that from what you’ve said, which seems to be the case in South Africa right now maybe, is that cases have gone down so much, but the lockdown has continued for so long, that, you know, lockdown advocates could simply say, well, that’s because of the lockdown. Now you, you have good explanations for why that is not the case, but for, from the lock-, from the lockdown advocate’s point of view, he could always rescue his theory if the lockdown persists. If he gets the lockdown to persist and cases go down, which they might have anyway for whatever other reason, he can say, see, it was because of the lockdown.
Nick: Yes. The, the field is riddled by post hoc ergo propter hoc arguments, rain dance arguments, you know: we, we did a rain dance, it rained, therefore rain dances work. And it’s, it’s not difficult to, navigate around those if you know your way about epistemology and data, and statistics, I would say. Not at all difficult. We’re talking undergraduate stuff, first year, if not... And this, this has been a consistent refrain which I’ve been horrified to see coming out of the mouths of PhD scientists, epidemiologists, you know.
And it’s very easy to refute. You know, if your model structure produces a certain effect from, or predicts a certain effect from lockdown, and that effect is nowhere in evidence, then that would be a mark against the theory, or fatal flaw of the theory or explanation. And another, another one is, well, give me the curve and, as a, you know, blind, without telling me where the lockdown was, and ask me to show you where the lockdown was in the data series. Given the profundity of the effects that are predicted, it should be easy to do that. It’s impossible. Nobody can do it. You can’t tell the curves, that you can’t tell, the, the, the characteristic functions of the epidemiological curves in a lockdown nation from the characteristic functions from a, from a non-lockdown nation. And, it’s just, yeah, there’s no regime change, as it were. You cannot see the lockdown regime being implemented and lifted in the data at all. And that is a devastating criticism.
Yes, something you mentioned there that I just wanted to pick up on, you said reduction in cases. I think one of the big flaws of analysis has been to spend any time at all studying cases, because cases are a subset of infections. So you’re not reading the infection curve. They’re a small subset of infections. And they also, so then cases does not represent infections at all. And they also do not represent clinically relevant cases, because we’ve taken on this practice of counting people who test positive but do not manifest symptoms of the disease as cases. So they’re neither fish nor fowl, and they’re manifestations of testing regimes as much as they are of infection and prevalence levels.
And so it’s very difficult to untangle those, and much better to focus on the death curves, even though, as I mentioned earlier, those are also not perfect, because of the tendency to collect deaths with rather than deaths from in the time series. But they have a lot better than utilizing cases. So we more or less from the beginning have disregarded cases in all respects and focused on the deaths. In the Darth Vader kind of voice, I always say that: focus on the deaths.
Dennis: Well, there certainly was a weird switch that happened kind of silently at the beginning. There was a lot of talk about cases. Sorry, initially there was a lot of talk about deaths, and then people just suddenly switched to talking about cases, because there weren’t that many deaths, apparently.
Nick: Yes, I think that was part of the political switch, yeah.
Dennis: Right. Now, but there seems to be some hope, I mean, for one, with the work you’re doing, and then also there is something called the Great Barrington Declaration. What is that?
Nick: The Great Barrington Declaration is a simple two-page document attempting to replace some of the bad science with good science and pointing out some of the things that I’ve gone on about this evening, notably the, the idea of focused protection, which references this observation that the mortality rates are very different across the population, that young and healthy people are more or less at negligible risk, and old people are more seriously afflicted if they contract the disease. And so it goes back to that point that I made, that the optimal protective mechanism is to maximize the mobility difference between the vulnerable and the non-vulnerable, not to minimize it, which is what lockdown does. And so it endorses the concept of focused protection, doing what you can to make sure that the vulnerable are in that unexposed group.
And there are a number of other aspects to it. I would encourage all of your listeners to give a careful read-through of the Barrington Declaration, to sign it if they agree with it after reading it and having heard what I’ve had to say this evening. And it was promoted by initially three proclaimed infectious diseases specialists or professors of medicine, Professor Sunetra Gupta of Oxford University, Professor Martin Kulldorff of Harvard and Professor Jay Bhattacharya of Stanford.
And they have, to great extent, from the very beginning, called this thing correctly, seen it in a very clear way, each working from their own independent perspectives. They were not working together from the beginning, in the same way that we sat in South Africa reading the situation with completely, not blissfully, but totally unaware of the existence of any epidemiologists or infectious diseases specialists who saw things the way we were. We were feeling completely alone and isolated.
And it’s interesting, I interviewed Professor Gupta a couple of weeks ago. That interview is available on our website. And it was a relaxed conversation more than an interview. And I loved it. I loved every minute of it. Wonderful woman she is. But a comment she made was that she felt very alone. And so these scientists found each other on, I don’t know how that happened, through social media, through academic channels, I’m not sure. And they came together in Great Barrington, a town in, which state is it? I’ve forgotten now.
Dennis: I don’t know. I’ve never visited it.
Nick: But they came together in the town for the purpose of drafting that declaration, and it’s since been signed by tens of thousands of scientists and hundreds of thousands or something like that of laymen. And yeah, for me, a document, I can support almost all of it. There are a few quibbles I would have with the detail, but that would be cumulatively to focus on those. The general intent of the document is to bring order in the chaos and to refute some of the very bad science that has been handed around in the context of lockdowns and NPIs in general.
And yeah, we are great supporters. Those three scientists are all members of PANDA’s Scientific Advisory Board, alongside Professor Michael Levitt, Nobel Laureate 2012, and Professor Sucharit Bhakdi of the University of Mainz, and we value their support in our initiative very highly.
It was also the subject of a contradicting document called the John Snow Memorandum, which is, I’m pleased to report, received much less uptake than the Great Barrington Declaration, maybe an order of magnitude less. Very strange document, that one, seeming to refute the very science on which the models on which lockdown was promoted relied. Strange lot.
And the people who support it also, there was an interview recently or a debate between Jay Bhattacharya and one of the signatories of the John Snow Memorandum, where for the most part his arguments seem to go around an ad hominem attack and some strange points about the location of where the document was signed, the Great Barrington Declaration, and the meaning of that, rather than actually addressing the science. I think that’s a sure sign of the Great Barrington Declaration having the upper hand in terms of scientific wisdom.
Dennis: Right. So now when we say we want to protect the vulnerable and basically let everyone else go about their daily lives as they please, I’m assuming we still don’t mean lock the vulnerable down.
Nick: Definitely not, for the same reasons that you and I agreed upon earlier.
Dennis: Right. Okay, so how would you convince a lockdown advocate that voluntary isolation of the people who are vulnerable works?
Nick: I would appeal to their recognition of the value in every human being, to their recognition of human agency, rather than trying to go through some logical exercise. This is very disturbing for me, this idea that there are people who just don’t know what’s good for them. I don’t see my fellow man as being in that position. So I would rather persuade them of the ethical virtues of informed consent, or just information. Let’s forget about the consent, because that suggests that you’re proposing a lockdown or subjugation.
I think people are sensible. I watch my own parents and my wife’s parents, and they kind of read the situation and they take certain precautions, but by and large they realize that life must be lived, and they evaluate trade-offs in their own special way. And I can’t tell you how many old people have come up to me with supportive words, you know, knowing, having listened to an interview or read one of our many articles. And they have for us words to the effect that they are so glad to hear our voice, because it breaks their hearts when their children are not in school and enjoying their lives or going through the important stages of life, and when their own children are prevented from earning a living for their, for their children, you know. It’s, it’s very, it’s actually tear-jerking stuff most of the time, because you realize what they’ve been through at the face, in the face of lockdown.
But, a very amusing anecdote in this regard: when our first paper on quantifying years of life lost came out, in the first version of it, we had a section at the end where we had the, the, that focused protection idea inserted, and we spoke about cocooning the elderly, which was a carefully chosen word to avoid, right, locking down the elderly. But it was read nonetheless by an elderly actuary as, suggesting that old people would be locked down, and he wrote us a scathing note saying, “I may be 87, but, you have no right,” you know. Right. And I loved that. I loved that, receiving that note, because it just rang, there was something human about it and then something irrepressible about it. And I kind of read that and I said, yeah, I can’t, I hope that when I’m 87, if I ever reach that age, I will have as much spit and fire in my gut as him.
Dennis: Yeah. Yeah, yeah, I agree. I think, people on the whole are sensible. They should be. And honestly, even if they’re not, that still doesn’t justify forcing them to do something that they don’t want to do. And it also much less justifies sacrificing the lives of others for their insensibility. It’s just not something that should be done. Life contains risks. They’re unavoidable.
Nick: They’re unavoidable and part of the beauty of life. We need to confront them, and we need to live lives of courage and agency and industriousness. And what this whole lockdown situation speaks to is exactly the opposite, the safety culture, cancel culture, being slaves to the great government, to the great overlords. It’s the opposite of what makes mankind so promising and human ingenuity and curiosity so exciting. And, as I said earlier, it’s deeply disturbing to me to see it, the caving in to the dark side of human nature having been so widespread and rapid.
And I know, having said that, ultimately people think they’re doing something good when they wear a mask and when they lock down. There may be overwhelmingly people for whom lockdown has light consequences, right, people who can easily work remotely or who have vast financial resources and therefore have no concern about where the next meal is coming from. I do realize that they believe they’re, they’re, that they’re, they’re preventing their grandparents from dying, maybe, or that they’re keeping them safe. You know, that, that may be a fairly large motive, but it’s, it’s wrong. They’re, they’re not actually doing that.
Dennis: Yep.
Nick: And the logic may be one step deeper than the basic intuition of social distancing and mask wearing, but it’s definitely a logic that, every human being is capable of bridging. And so I find that, although I sort of pity a person with that perspective, I find it difficult to respect it.
Dennis: Yeah, I can see why. And I agree they’re not actually doing the protective work that they think they’re doing. And I agree that a lot of people have good intentions behind this, but many crimes have been committed in the name of good intentions. So that is not the moral yardstick. Nobody wants to be evil, but much evil has been done.
Nick: Nobody wants to be evil.
Dennis: Right.
Nick: 100%, Dennis. And there’s also an aspect of willful blindness. You don’t have to think for very long about life in Peru under a brutal, draconian, military-enforced lockdown to realize that that has got to have some heart-wrenching, gut-wrenching consequences. Just a little bit of empathy, at the risk of using an overused term, is in my mind not too much to demand.
Dennis: I agree. Yeah. Do you see any silver lining that has come out of the lockdown? I know it might be hard to, to focus on that right now, but has there anything good come out of this, other than lessons learned?
Nick: Yes, I do. I don’t think we are very far from the point at which we realize the great tragedy that is wrapped up in these weaknesses that I’ve been talking about, the safety culture, the cancel culture, and the lack of curiosity and industriousness. I think people will get a shock when they fully bear the brunt of the long-term consequences of these actions, because there will be many of them. Long after the virus has receded into the distance of as yet another seasonal endemic respiratory virus, we will be dealing with the fallout of these ill-advised policy recommendations.
And I think there will be anger and there will be reaction, and I think many of these weaknesses, which have been brewing in society for decades, these are not new things, will be flushed and exposed. That’s, that’s, that’s my sense, and my hope. I hope that we can get away from safety culture. I hope we can get away from identity politics. I hope we can get away from inhibitions on free speech, yes. I hope we can get away from relativism. But, I hope we can get away from that stuff they’ve spent far too long in the academia.
And another victim, I hope, because I think, I think it’s been a real problem here, it’s been the extent to which these teams are formed, the modeling teams and the response teams are formed by people of a very narrow bandwidth, experts in a very narrow field. It was almost like, well, here comes a disease, we must get disease experts to come and sit here and tell us what to do, even though what they were telling you to do had ramifications in all sorts of other fields. So to my mind, a much better approach would have been to populate any advisory team with people from a variety of disciplines.
And I think that fairly mirrors the nature of many academic departments these days. They’re formed by people who are specialists in incredibly and increasingly narrow fields, replete with their own jargon that is unintelligible to people in other disciplines. And so to me, this was a huge failing, but also reflective of the culture that has evolved in universities. And we need to reappraise that. We need to reappraise the virtues of general education before specialization. And we need to reappraise the virtues of multidisciplinary teams.
And that’s a feature of PANDA. We have people from all walks, immunologists and vaccinologists, sure, but also economists and lawyers and actuaries and statisticians and data scientists on our team, and have had from the beginning. And I think it’s, and public health experts, and doctors, and, you know, I think it’s been a reason why we’ve been able to get to the heart of things very quickly, is the perspective of one professional was challenged by the perspective of another from a different field, leading to very rapid knowledge growth, right? And I do hope that that, yeah, I do hope that that comes, comes out.
And I must say, I’ve read exactly that in the work of David Deutsch and in your book, is the value of having a mind that crosses disciplines. We have been too inclined to worship the narrow expert. And I know that there’s almost a sense in which there’s a bit of Ludditism associated with criticism of experts. There’s this idea that there are out there a bunch of thugs and ogres who don’t appreciate experts. No, it’s more a question of being skeptical about a person who has expertise in a narrow field and having some admiration for a well-read, curious person who is fairly well-versed and reasonably steeped in a variety of fields.
Such polymaths, generalists, Victorians, Renaissance men are not held in very high esteem these days. And we tend either to support these incredibly narrow experts or a bunch of charlatans with the latest, you know, the Johnny-come-lately theory of how the world works expressed in a 200-page paperback. And the loss of the richly educated, deeply curious, studious generalist is, I think, something that we ought to think about.
Dennis: I agree. And I think philosophy in general should be held in much higher regard. We can see, evidently, it’s particularly clear in this situation now, that bad philosophy, bad epistemology in particular, leads to bad political philosophy, leads to bad policies, leads to terrible treatment of people.
One silver lining I will say that I’ve seen come out of the, it might really be the only one, is the, that children have been less subjective, subjected to force, from what I can tell. I’m opposed to mandatory schooling. So the fact that children aren’t forced to actually go to some place, that I think is a good thing. Of course, that was not by design, and it didn’t come out of some philosophical realization that forcing children is bad. It came out of different motivations. That is the one silver lining I see.
Otherwise, I can only hope that you’re right, that people will understand what is happening. I saw that you wrote on Twitter, there will be trials. I hope that’s correct. Grave injustices are being done, and I think you’re doing great work. How can people find you, and what can they do to help you?
Nick: Well, we have a huge demand for resources, is because our work has been expanding on the international stage at a rate of knots, and we have more tasks than we have people. So scientists who might quietly have harbored reservations about the direction in which the world is heading, but been unable to find a place to work and contribute to a movement against, are very welcome at PANDA. We do preserve confidentiality when that is demanded by the circumstances. And there are a great number. In fact, only a minority of the members of PANDA appear on our website.
You can look at our website. It’s www.pandata.org. Twitter handle is, and the Facebook handle is, PanData19. My Twitter handle is NickHudsonCT, for Cape Town. Possibly poorly chosen. I might move one day. But love Cape Town, don’t get me wrong.
And we also have a donations button on our page and a variety of payments methods. We look after the cash that we receive and make sure that it all goes in the direction of promoting the mission. Nobody is paid to date. The funding has been by the members and by speaking engagements, and that is becoming unsustainable as we expand and need to promote our message on a wider stage.
And we also, one very valuable thing has been people who are prepared to look past the cancel culture aspect of the age and engage us in debate and argument. We value that, we prize it very highly, and are always willing to engage with people who are prepared to keep a calm voice and not lose their temper, and debate and argue. We value that very highly, and we have changed our minds on a couple of explanations and hope to do so again in future, because how else does knowledge grow?
Dennis: That is the sign of a rational mind. Great.
Nick: To any listeners who may not have been entirely convinced by the posture, or tone of voice, for that matter, I would just remind them that it’s always like that when knowledge moves, and to not go to the nearest conspiracy theory.
Dennis: Right.
Nick: We do not have a political agenda. We are a very diverse group. The people come from many nations and having occupied many positions on the political spectra. So I would just appeal to such people who might be listening with some doubts to suspend the judgment and to go along with some of the thought processes, and rather to engage us than to dismiss.
And then other than that, I have a resource request from you. PANDA would very much like to host you on one of our podcasts one of these days, because I think our epistemology is very aligned with yours and far more rudimentary than the one that you’ve developed in your excellent book.
Dennis: Well, you’re very kind to say that. I would be happy to appear on your podcast. Yeah, absolutely. Okay. It was great to have you on. I learned a lot.
Nick: Thank you, Dennis. And thanks very much for reaching out. It’s been a lot of fun. Late night here now, but I’ve been kept wide awake by the conversation. Thank you.
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