Dennis Hackethal’s Blog
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History of post ‘Crypto-Fallibilism’
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@@ -1,64 +1,65 @@ # Why Is Today’s Art So Ugly? In ‘[The Esthetic Vacuum of Our Age](https://youtu.be/XKnuzzognqQ)’, Ayn Rand explains how art could devolve from this…  <small>Michelangelo’s David. Photo by Mark Neal [on Pexels](https://www.pexels.com/photo/greek-statue-inside-room-2119642).</small> …to this:  <small>Modern ‘art’. Photo (cropped) by Vanta Nev [on Unsplash](https://unsplash.com/photos/a-statue-of-a-person-with-a-building-in-the-background-77lS43UrbpE).</small> Rand explains today’s esthetic vacuum by reference to *mysticism* and the end of the most recent *age of reason*. According to her, there have been only three periods when a philosophy of reason dominated the zeitgeist: Ancient Greece, the renaissance, and the 19th century.[^1] Rand continues: “It is only in these three periods that the dominant trend in art was not dedicated to the degrading and deforming of man, but to the glorification of man, of his existence, and of this earth.” Whenever a philosophy of reason was dominant, art showed how man *can* and *ought* to be. This is the purpose of art which Aristotle identified.[^2] During all other periods, art was primarily done in service of religion; to depict man as a pathetic, helpless being. The dominant art form during the 19th century, which was, again, compatible with reason, was *romanticism*. “The greatest artistic innovation of the 19th century was a new literary form: the novel”, says Rand. “Prior to the 19th century, literature presented man as a helpless being whose life and actions were determined by forces beyond his control; either by fate and the gods (as in the Greek tragedies) or by an innate weakness, a tragic flaw (as in the plays of Shakespeare).” She continues: “Writers regarded man as metaphysically impotent, incapable of achieving his goals or of directing the course of his life. All of them shared the premise of determinism. On that premise, one could not project what *might* happen to man; one could only record what *did* happen […].” Rand concludes that fiction was impossible to pursue for such writers. Man with free will appeared in literature only in the 19th century, “and the novel was his proper literary form.” For the first time, readers could enjoy a *plot*, which is “the dramatization of man’s free will” and “the physical form of his spiritual sovereignty, of his power to deal with existence.” (By “spiritual sovereignty”, Rand does not mean anything supernatural – after all, she was an atheist. I think she’s instead referring to man’s power of volition.) In other words, the novel mapped perfectly onto the conception of man as a being of his own, self-chosen purpose. Unlike their mystic predecessors, romantics did not view man as a helpless pawn of forces beyond his understanding. They recognized that the course of his life was the result of his own choices: that his life was his own responsibility. And so they didn’t record events that *had* happened and the choices man *had* made – instead, they wrote about events that *should* happen and the choices man *should* make. *Capitalism*, which peaked in the 19th century, was the political and economic system that gave man the freedom to achieve this self-chosen purpose, argues Rand. The regression of art in our age, on the other hand, is a symptom of the wider regression from reason back to mysticism and collectivism, starting at the end of the romantic period. Romantic artists gradually vanished as others “undertook once more the task of degrading man.” Romanticism was replaced by *naturalism*, says Rand, which returned to the view of man not as a product of his own choices, not as having the power of volition, but as a “helpless creature determined by forces beyond his control.” Some people, I should add, express this alleged helplessness by blaming others. The [‘I couldn’t help it’ type thinking](/posts/where-s-david-deutsch-s-accountability#:~:text=how%20poorly%20things%20go%20when%20people%20don't%20want%20to%20take%20responsibility) Rand explores in her novel *Atlas Shrugged* is a symptom of this kind of mysticism. With the rise of collectivism, naturalists accepted ‘society’ as their master. According to Rand, they wanted to record man not as he could be and should be but *as he is*, essentially demoting art to journalism. To naturalists, life is senseless, aimless, and meaningless, and values are impossible. But beauty is a major value, so if an ‘artist’ thinks values are impossible, he thinks beauty is impossible. And, I might add: if he thinks man is pathetic and helpless, then he – being a man himself – must necessarily create pathetic art. So then it’s no surprise his ‘art’ is ugly. But it didn’t stop there. Rand explains that, to determine what man is like, naturalists wanted to record the common, the representative, the statistical. Since success is rare, they documented failure; since beauty is rare, they documented ugly, and so on. Over time, they concluded that such values as success and beauty are not real at all; that only vices are real. This descent into mediocrity found its abyss in *symbolism*. Rand explains: “What you read today is not naturalism any longer. It is symbolism. […] it is the symbolism of the jungle. According to this modern view of man, depravity represents man’s real, essential, metaphysical nature, while virtue does not. Virtue is only an accident, an exception, or an illusion. Therefore, a monster is a projection of man’s essence, but a hero is not.” > % source: Ayn Rand, ‘The Esthetic Vacuum of Our Age’ > #### In mordern sculpture, man is presented, when he is recognizable at all, as a barely differentiated chunk of stone with the limbs of a malformed gorilla. For the vast majority of history, ugly was the default; it’s the emergence and disappearance of *beauty* that need explaining.[^3] Since many people do not enjoy ugly art and do not voluntarily spend money to see it, modern ‘artists’ demand government subsidies to continue their butchery of man. Still, some people consume ugly art. Why? Rand explains this, too: a rational man with a rational philosophy will find the hero of a romantic novel inspiring. Such a novel offers rational men respite – it shows them a world in which their values have been realized and gives them the courage and energy to continue pursuing it. But to *irrational* men, a hero is a reminder of their failures, and “the image of a monster serves to reassure them. They feel, in effect: ‘I am not *that* bad.’” They hope for a “blank moral check”, says Rand. (Today, proponents of plus-size ‘modeling’ look for a blank esthetic check; when they see obese models stomping down the catwalk, they think to themselves: ‘I am not *that* ugly.’) Remember this distinction between rational and irrational consumers of art when you evaluate someone’s taste, and consider what people accidentally confess in how they judge art and beauty. ## Free will vs neuroscience Ayn Rand’s account of the demotion of art to journalism is reminiscent of the demotion of philosophy, particularly epistemology, to neuroscience. In a way, this second demotion is even worse because scientists are considered [learned men with authority, so they are more difficult to question than journalists](/posts/what-would-popper-have-said-about-covid-scientis). Who are we to argue with them? An authority’s errors are harder to correct, sometimes even entrenched in law. Like naturalism, the natural sciences have no purview into how man ought to be, nor can they provide a metaphysics by which to judge man’s proper role in the universe. *That* is the purview of philosophy. It’s become fashionable for scientists and scientifically minded people to deny free will. Consider Sam Harris: a neuroscientist, philosopher, and outspoken atheist, he has long defended reason against mysticism – or so it seems. Here’s his stance on free will: > % source: Sam Harris, *The Joe Rogan Experience* episode \#1241 > % link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OFazP2nBIqQ > Taking the red pill on free will […] you see [that] everyone is an open system. No one authored themselves. No one created themselves. No one […] can directly regulate the effect of every influence that they had or didn’t have. You are the totality of what brought you here. […] The universe has sort of just pushed you to this point in time, and the only thing you’ve got is your brain and its states, and that is based on your genes and the totality of environmental influences you as a system have had working on you up until this moment. And so, the next words that come out of your-moth+mouth are part of that process. > +> Now, some people find this to be a, frankly, demoralizing picture. They think, ‘okay well, you’re telling me I’m just a robot.’ But you’re a robot that is open, continuously open, to influence. Sound familiar? Whether he knows it or not, and although he sells it as revelatory and groundbreaking (“red pill”), Harris continues the age-old mystical tradition of degrading man. He’s just updated it with modern references to robotics, genetics, and neuroscience. By denying free will, and with it, the self, Harris and others like him advocate that tired view of man as a helpless, pathetic creature whose life is determined not by his own values and choices but by powers beyond his control – in this case, “the universe” (ie, the determinism of the laws of physics), his genes (ie, genetic determinism), the environment, or his neurocircuitry, say. Harris implies that, if you don’t have complete control, you have none – and who could possibly control the entire universe? Further, if your neurocircuitry is your innate weakness, your original sin, and it determines your choices before you realize it, [as some have argued](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Benjamin_Libet#Implications_of_Libet's_experiments), then how could you possibly direct your own life? Harris’s view may *sound* scientific, but the purpose of science is not to debase man. It’s to help man understand and control the world. And in reality, physical determinism and free will don’t conflict in the first place. As I’ve written [before](https://veritula.com/ideas/1550), “they describe different phenomena on different levels of emergence.” And more: “[N]ot only do they not conflict, physical determinism is *required* for free will to exist. It is *because* computers [such as the brain] obey physical determinism that they are able to run programs in the first place, including creative programs, ie programs with free will.” ([Yes, the brain is a computer.](https://veritula.com/discussions/133)) If man had no free will, then he would merely be an animal – nothing more. Scientists have long defamed man as being just another animal. This view seems true only through a parochial, *biological* lens: yes, humans are mammals. But, like the neuroscientific reduction of epistemology to the study of the brain’s hardware (in blatant and unscientific violation of the substrate independence of computation), to hold exclusively the biological view of man as an animal is an *epistemological* error. As Rand argues in ‘The Objectivist Ethics’, animals survive “by the guidance of mere percepts.”[^4] Man, on the other hand, survives by forming *concepts*. “He cannot provide for his simplest physical needs without a process of thought.” Without free will, there could be no concept formation, no [values](/posts/core-objectivist-values), no responsibility, no beauty, no human life. There could be no [justice](/posts/charity-vs-justice), either – which is why Harris argues that retributive justice against animals makes no sense. That *is* true for *animals*, but he implies that it makes no sense against humans either; and his denial of justice leads him to advocate a lenient treatment of criminals by blaming their crimes on factors beyond their control: “Everything, on some level, is more of a force of nature than it is something that you need to take personally.” Thank god (pun intended) Harris is not a policymaker. Denying free will by reference to science – neuroscience or what have you – is just another way to escape the responsibility of volition. And if that attempted escape leads somewhere bad, which it eventually does, the denier gets to blame scientists (or physics or “the universe” or whatever hand-wavy excuse he may come up with). Sam Harris’s denial of free will is a textbook example of how [mysticism can ruin the thought processes of otherwise careful thinkers](/posts/mysticism-and-the-mathematicians-misconception). Placing his claims in an historical context shows that he just continues the age-old practice of degrading man. [^1]: David Deutsch’s book *The Beginning of Infinity* overlaps with this claim. Deutsch identifies roughly the same periods, but in his view, the most recent one continues to this day as the enlightenment. [^2]: Today, [bodybuilding](/posts/bodybuilding-as-art) is one of the few remaining art forms true to this purpose, whereas [‘plus-size models’](/posts/the-descent-into-mediocrity-continues) represent the cultural debasement of the human physique. [^3]: I am reminded of author Logan Chipkin’s parallel, economic view that poverty is the default and wealth needs explaining. [^4]: As quoted [previously](/posts/do-objectivists-attribute-moral-value-to-animals).
Revision 1 · · View this version (v2)
Reference concept of intellectual fashion
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ The crypto-fallibilist eagerly reminds others of Popper's credo so that he can i While he explicitly agrees that he could be wrong about *anything anytime*, he refuses to consider that, say, he could be wrong about something he *feels* 'certain' about, that others might know some of his thoughts and motivations [better than he does himself](/posts/mind-reading), or that he could be lying to himself. Just as an honest person will take seriously accusations that he has lied, even (or especially) to himself, a fallibilist will take just as seriously accusations that he isn't being fallibilist – but a crypto won't do that. His actions betray him. Cryptos think that having read a few books by Popper or Deutsch is enough; that subscribing to fallibilism as a philosophy is enough. But it isn't. That alone doesn't make them actual fallibilists. +Crypto-fallibilism is just an *intellectual fashion*, as Popper would call it.[^1] In discussions, some crypto-fallibilists have derided my thoughts on the matter as 'purity testing'. But what is so wrong with taking Popper's credo literally and seriously, and [judging](https://courses.aynrand.org/works/how-does-one-lead-a-rational-life-in-an-irrational-society/) accordingly? Some have also shrugged off these criticisms as them just 'fallibly being fallible'. That's a cop-out answer. While I agree that we can always only *practice* fallibilism and that we inevitably make mistakes, at times grave ones, even in our fallibilism itself, there's a difference between honest attempts on the one hand and reckless violations, lies, and [evasions](http://aynrandlexicon.com/lexicon/evasion.html) on the other. @@ -26,9 +26,10 @@ Because crypto-fallibilists are hypocritical justification-seekers, they are wor I'd like to be a fallibilist, but I don't yet know how. Slowly exposing myself to more criticism could be a way. I also want to practice asking Socratic questions and having more modest expectations in critical discussions. In some of my past discussions, I sought to evangelize; it's not surprising that I often failed at that, and I see now that the attempt was wrong. I was a crypto-fallibilist myself; that was a mistake. Popper provides the following-pointers:+pointers:[^2] > Serious critical discussions are always difficult. Non-rational human elements such as personal problems always enter. Many participants in a rational, that is, a critical, discussion find it particularly difficult that they have to unlearn what their instincts seem to teach them (and what they are taught, incidentally, by every debating society): that is, to win. For what they have to learn is that victory in a debate is nothing, while even the slightest clarification of one's problem – even the smallest contribution made towards a clearer understanding of one's own position or that of one's opponent – is a great success. A discussion which you win but which fails to help you to change or to clarify your mind at least a little should be regarded as a sheer loss. [...] > Rational discussion in this sense is a rare thing. But it is an important ideal, and we may learn to enjoy it. It does not aim at conversion, and it is modest in its expectations: it is enough, more than enough, if we feel that we can see things in a new light or that we have got even a little nearer to the truth.-—+[^1]: Popper, Karl. *The Myth of the Framework*-(p. 44).+(p. 224, esp. ix f.). Taylor and Francis. Kindle Edition. +[^2]: Ibid. (p. 44).
Original · · View this version (v1)
# Crypto-Fallibilism A fallibilist is *always* willing to consider that he could be wrong about *anything*. His attitude can be summed up by Karl Popper's credo (as quoted [here](/posts/fallibility-table)): > #### *‘I may be wrong and you may be right, and by an effort, we may get nearer to the truth.’* Note that Popper does not limit his credo. He doesn't say 'I may *sometimes* be wrong' or 'you may *sometimes* be right'. Again, we can always be wrong about anything. Knowledge is inherently uncertain and one should remain open to the possibility of being mistaken. A crypto-fallibilist outwardly subscribes to Popper's credo but does not follow through on it. He lacks the requisite [integrity](http://aynrandlexicon.com/lexicon/integrity.html). He may promote fallibilism explicitly, but he doesn't live it. At most, he is a fallibilist in some carefully constrained way. Crypto-fallibilism is a form of *hypocrisy*, a type of fraud: it's to pretend (to oneself or others) that one is a fallibilist. The crypto-fallibilist eagerly reminds others of Popper's credo so that he can imply that '*you* may be wrong and *I* may be right'. Worse, he has plausible deniability because he can always claim that the unmodified credo applies to him just the same as to others. He seeks to evangelize, even to spread fallibilism, ironically, but not to learn. He enjoys showing others when they're wrong but hates being proven wrong himself, at least in some areas. He doesn't discuss to find his own mistakes; he instead discusses to 'win', to show you that he *is* right and you wrong. He repeats fallibilist phrases – such as Popper's credo; 'don't immunize theories against criticism!' (a nod to Hans Albert); 'don't destroy the means of error correction!' (another to David Deutsch) – to associate with other cryptos. While he explicitly agrees that he could be wrong about *anything anytime*, he refuses to consider that, say, he could be wrong about something he *feels* 'certain' about, that others might know some of his thoughts and motivations [better than he does himself](/posts/mind-reading), or that he could be lying to himself. Just as an honest person will take seriously accusations that he has lied, even (or especially) to himself, a fallibilist will take just as seriously accusations that he isn't being fallibilist – but a crypto won't do that. His actions betray him. Cryptos think that having read a few books by Popper or Deutsch is enough; that subscribing to fallibilism as a philosophy is enough. But it isn't. That alone doesn't make them actual fallibilists. In discussions, some crypto-fallibilists have derided my thoughts on the matter as 'purity testing'. But what is so wrong with taking Popper's credo literally and seriously, and [judging](https://courses.aynrand.org/works/how-does-one-lead-a-rational-life-in-an-irrational-society/) accordingly? Some have also shrugged off these criticisms as them just 'fallibly being fallible'. That's a cop-out answer. While I agree that we can always only *practice* fallibilism and that we inevitably make mistakes, at times grave ones, even in our fallibilism itself, there's a difference between honest attempts on the one hand and reckless violations, lies, and [evasions](http://aynrandlexicon.com/lexicon/evasion.html) on the other. There *are* some valid exceptions, such as protecting yourself from abuse or not talking to someone who you suspect wants to use what you say against you (legally or otherwise), eg not talking to the police without a lawyer. In such cases, you can reasonably claim that the people involved have already destroyed the means of error correction. Also, being a fallibilist doesn't mean others have a right to force you to discuss – you still have freedom of association. But compared to all the interactions one typically has, these situations are rare, and crypto-fallibilists will find reasons to continue being hypocrites more frequently than that. Detecting crypto-fallibilism in someone isn't hard. I have found that it usually only takes maybe a dozen questions in a Socratic dialog to find something cryptos are not willing to challenge. That alone doesn't make them cryptos – most people are at least a little pigheaded – but if they nonetheless maintain that they're fallibilists, or if they say that fallibilism doesn't extend to that situation, that's an implicit confession that they're cryptos. They may even say they admire Socrates, arguably the first fallibilist, but I suspect that if they ever met a real-life Socrates today, they'd hate him. Because crypto-fallibilists are hypocritical justification-seekers, they are worse than regular justificationists. That's a shame since all it takes to avoid the hypocrisy is an admission that they're not true fallibilists. (Instead of putting 'fallibilist' in your Twitter bio, put 'aspiring fallibilist'!) I'd like to be a fallibilist, but I don't yet know how. Slowly exposing myself to more criticism could be a way. I also want to practice asking Socratic questions and having more modest expectations in critical discussions. In some of my past discussions, I sought to evangelize; it's not surprising that I often failed at that, and I see now that the attempt was wrong. I was a crypto-fallibilist myself; that was a mistake. Popper provides the following pointers: > Serious critical discussions are always difficult. Non-rational human elements such as personal problems always enter. Many participants in a rational, that is, a critical, discussion find it particularly difficult that they have to unlearn what their instincts seem to teach them (and what they are taught, incidentally, by every debating society): that is, to win. For what they have to learn is that victory in a debate is nothing, while even the slightest clarification of one's problem – even the smallest contribution made towards a clearer understanding of one's own position or that of one's opponent – is a great success. A discussion which you win but which fails to help you to change or to clarify your mind at least a little should be regarded as a sheer loss. [...] > Rational discussion in this sense is a rare thing. But it is an important ideal, and we may learn to enjoy it. It does not aim at conversion, and it is modest in its expectations: it is enough, more than enough, if we feel that we can see things in a new light or that we have got even a little nearer to the truth. — *The Myth of the Framework* (p. 44). Taylor and Francis. Kindle Edition.